

How Do Government Guarantees Affect Deposit Supply?

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Abstract

The market value of deposit insurance changes over time and across banks as the value of the underlying put option changes, but the premium banks pay for the insurance does not adjust to completely capture this variation. Consequently, their incentive to supply insured deposits changes with the subsidy they enjoy from deposit insurance. Factors that increase the subsidy, such as asset risk, move the supply curve outward. Consistent with this idea, we show that the supply of insured deposits increases when banks become riskier. Our findings uncover a novel channel of deposit supply, with implications for existing research on the deposits channel of monetary policy.

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1 Introduction

Bank deposits play a central role in economic growth and liquidity creation, motivating a large literature that studies the forces shaping their demand and supply and their consequences for economic outcomes. Economic shocks, policy choices, consumer preference, and banking market structure have all been shown to affect the demand and supply of deposits. In this paper, we uncover a new channel that shifts the supply curve of bank deposits: variation in the effective subsidy that banks enjoy from deposit insurance. Beyond the immediate implication of our work for the theory and practice of bank funding, our results also have important implications for recent advancements in the literature, including the effect of interest rates on deposit supply.

The classical view of deposit insurance focuses on moral hazard in asset selection. Subsidized insurance encourages banks to take excessive risks on the asset side of the balance sheet. Yet we know surprisingly little about whether banks also optimize their liability structure to extract maximum value from government guarantees. When a bank experiences financial distress and traditional funding sources become more expensive or scarce, how does it respond on the liability side? Does it actively shift toward subsidized funding through insured deposits? This paper provides the first systematic evidence that banks do precisely this, expanding their supply of insured deposits when the value of deposit insurance increases as a result of increased bank risk. While uninsured deposits leave banks as they become riskier, the increase in insured deposits allows them to protect their total deposits base.

Bank deposits are insured by regulators in almost all major economies. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) guarantees deposits up to a certain amount in the event of a bank's failure. Banks pay a premium to the FDIC to avail of this guarantee. The FDIC's guarantee gives the insured bank a *put option* that can be exercised in the event of default. Therefore, the market value of deposit insurance varies with factors that change the value of a put option, such as the riskiness of the underlying assets. Importantly, however, the premiums paid by banks do not adjust fully to reflect changes in its market value for three key, not mutually exclusive, reasons: (a) banks are classified into coarse risk categories for FDIC insurance assessments, (b) premiums change infrequently, and (c) premiums typically depend on the actuarial value of insurance and not on the risk-neutral distribution of losses. Figure 1 plots the average bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads, a measure of the market's assessment of bank risk, and the premium that banks pay on insured deposits. Both the level and variation in CDS spreads dwarf the

assessment fees, in line with our argument that insurance premium is relatively risk-insensitive and highly subsidized. Consequently, the government guarantee in the form of deposit insurance creates variation in the effective subsidy across time and across banks.

To see why subsidy variation matters for deposit supply, consider a bank whose loan portfolio deteriorates. As credit quality declines, the bank's funding costs typically rise, bond spreads widen, equity becomes more expensive, and uninsured depositors may demand higher rates or withdraw funds entirely. Yet the FDIC premium remains essentially constant. From the bank's perspective, the relative attractiveness of insured deposits has increased: the implicit government subsidy has grown larger precisely when alternative funding sources have become more costly because their pricing is sensitive to bank risk. This creates a strong incentive to expand insured deposit supply. These incentives are economically significant: insured deposits average 77% of total deposits, the subsidy on insurance premiums can reach 40–90 basis points (Duffie et al., 2003), and we estimate it can shift a bank's return on equity by up to 5 percentage points.

We formalize these intuitions in a standard model of insurance pricing that follows Merton (1977), where deposit insurance is priced as a put option owned by insured banks. Banks face a convex cost function in raising deposits and the subsidy obtained through the underpriced insurance premium influences their decision to supply deposits. The model shows that the deposit supply curve shifts outwards when a bank's asset risk increases. The supply curve also shifts outward in the low-interest rate regime because policy rates are often lowered in bad economic times. The negative correlation between interest rate and volatility leads to an outward shift in the supply curve when interest rates are low.

We test these implications using detailed data on the quantity and pricing of deposits for all U.S. banks covered in the Call Reports from 1986 to 2023. Our goal is to empirically establish a link between the deposit insurance subsidy that a riskier bank enjoys and its deposit supply. In our main tests, we use the loan loss provisions (LLP) to total loans ratio as our key measure of asset risk. Since asset risk is an unobserved quantity, using the LLP ratio as a proxy for asset risk has several benefits. First, the measure is an indicator of the performance of the bank's assets, mapping directly to the model primitive. Second, it captures the riskiness of a bank's asset through the deterioration in its lending portfolio, allowing us to measure the time-varying nature of a bank's asset risk. Third, it is available for the entire sample of banks for a long period, providing us with substantial variation in macroeconomic shocks and bank risk. Finally, the measure provides us with the manager's assessment of forward-looking losses on loans they have made in the past.

Therefore, we are able to tease out the effect of managerial expectations of asset risk on how they adjust their deposit supply.

Our main specification estimates a panel regression using bank-quarter data over nearly four decades. Bank fixed effects absorb time-invariant characteristics such as management style, franchise value, and geographic footprint, while time fixed effects absorb aggregate shocks. Banks with a one-standard-deviation higher LLP ratio hold 0.50 percentage points more insured deposits, and the insured share of total deposits rises by 0.20 percentage points, consistent with our subsidy channel. Uninsured deposits decline with the LLP ratio, so as bank risk increases, reliance on risk-sensitive uninsured funding falls while reliance on subsidized insured deposits rises. On net, total deposits do not decline. If anything, total deposits rise modestly, implying that riskier banks ultimately attract more deposits.

Does the increase in insured deposits reflect a supply shift rather than higher depositor demand? We address this by analyzing deposit pricing responses to changes in subsidy value. If banks increase insured deposit supply in response to higher subsidy value, we expect prices to fall (i.e., interest rates to rise), while demand-side forces produce the opposite. We test this using insured deposit rate data from the Call Reports. Since our analysis focuses on insured deposits, bank credit risk should not influence their pricing, which allows us to cleanly separate subsidy effects. We find that a one-standard deviation increase in the LLP ratio is associated with deposit rates that are 2.2 to 2.7 basis points higher – a 1.66% increase relative to the sample average rate of 1.63% and corresponding to around \$68 in additional interest expenses on a \$250,000 deposit account. An increase in the quantity of insured deposits accompanied by lower prices (higher interest rates) is consistent with an outward shift in the supply curve.

Bank-level regressions cannot separately identify local demand and competition effects from the subsidy channel. We address this using branch-level deposit data, with branch and county $\times$ quarter-year fixed effects to absorb local conditions. Consistent with our main results, branches of banks with a one-standard-deviation higher LLP ratio experience a 1.4% increase in deposits.¹

Our results show that deposit growth at high-risk banks is not driven by demand-side considerations. A remaining identification challenge is reverse causality: banks receiving larger subsidies may make riskier investments, generating a spurious correlation between bank risk and deposits. Subsidized deposit insurance can increase risk-taking incentives, but increases in asset

¹Since we do not observe the breakdown of deposits into insured and uninsured components at the branch level, we are unable to analyze the effect of bank risk on the composition of deposits at this unit of analysis.

risk take time to materialize in loan losses. Higher LLP ratios therefore reflect portfolio choices made in earlier periods, mitigating contemporaneous reverse causality concerns.

To further address any remaining endogeneity concerns, we implement an instrumental variables strategy based on a shift-share design that interacts a bank's historical portfolio composition with economy-wide loan losses across asset categories. Because loan loss provisions are not broken out by loan category in the Call Reports, we first impute asset-class-specific LLP rates, and then, for each bank, fix portfolio weights across five asset classes: real estate, commercial and industrial (C&I), household and consumer, agricultural, and financial loans, at the first quarter the bank appears in the Call Reports, combining these weights with the time-varying imputed LLP rates to generate predicted LLP ratios. The resulting instrument exploits cross-sectional variation in initial portfolio choices and subsequent common shocks to asset-class-specific credit losses. Because portfolio allocations are fixed several years prior to the deposit supply decisions we study, and precede the realization of these shocks, the instrument is unlikely to be affected by reverse causality. These considerations form the basis of our identifying assumption. In the first-stage regression, the portfolio-weight instrument loads strongly and remains highly predictive even with bank and quarter-year fixed effects, with a first-stage F-statistic of 950. In the second stage, using the predicted LLP ratio, we find a positive and statistically significant effect on bank deposits: a one standard-deviation increase in the LLP ratio raises insured deposits by 6%.

We next examine the deposit-taking behavior of banks that eventually fail, a setting where bank risk unambiguously rises and reverse causality is implausible. We track these banks from 16 quarters before failure through the failure quarter. Riskier portfolio choices were made earlier, and increases in non-performing loans primarily reflect the realization of past lending decisions. Failing banks also face heightened supervisory scrutiny, limiting new risk-taking (Correia et al., 2025). Consistent with the subsidy channel, total deposits rise steadily, increasing by 35% in the quarters preceding failure, driven primarily by insured deposits and accompanied by rising interest rates on insured products.

Our results, so far, exploit cross-sectional variation across banks over time. To assess whether the same patterns emerge at the aggregate level, we next examine time-series evidence for the banking sector as a whole. Figure 2 plots quarterly changes in insured deposits alongside the LLP measure from 1986 to 2021; the two move together, with a correlation of 51%. Consistent with our channel, an increase in LLP is associated with a rise in the system-wide share of insured deposits. At the same time, the deposit spread, the difference between the federal funds rate and bank de-

posit rates, narrows as the LLP ratio rises, a correlation of 62%. Together, these time-series patterns indicate that periods of higher government subsidy coincide with an expansion in deposit supply, particularly insured deposits.

The deposit insurance subsidy also varies with policy rates, since rates are often lowered during periods of elevated banking-sector risk, linking our mechanism to the deposits channel of Drechsler et al. (2017). That channel attributes deposit supply responses to bank market power; ours attributes them to changes in subsidy value, and the two are complementary. We assess their interaction directly by augmenting the core deposits channel specification with the LLP ratio. LLP remains a strong predictor of deposit quantity, confirming that the subsidy channel operates independently of market power.

Our paper contributes to a large literature on the pricing and economic effects of deposit insurance. A long line of theoretical work prices deposit insurance as a put option on bank assets, beginning with Merton (1977) and extended by Marcus and Shaked (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986), Pennacchi (1987), Chan et al. (1992), and Dreyfus et al. (1994). Empirically, Duffie et al. (2003) show that fair-market premia move with bank credit spreads while administered FDIC premia adjust slowly, leaving deposit insurance only partially risk-sensitive even after recent reforms toward risk-based pricing.² A complementary literature documents the asset-side response to subsidized insurance, showing that banks take on greater portfolio risk when insurance is underpriced (Keeley, 1990; Calomiris and Jaremski, 2019). More recent work studies optimal policy design and pricing (Dávila and Goldstein, 2023; Allen et al., 2018; Kim and Rezende, 2023; Egan et al., 2022; Iyer et al., 2023).³ Whereas this literature prices deposit insurance for a given quantity of deposits and emphasizes asset-side moral hazard, we show that the *quantity* of insured deposits is itself endogenous to subsidy variation: banks expand insured-deposit supply precisely when the market value of the put option rises.

Second, our paper relates to research on the determinants of bank deposit supply and the deposits channel of monetary policy. Drechsler et al. (2017, 2021) establish the deposits channel, in which bank market power shapes deposit pricing. Related work studies deposit competition and the bank's deposit franchise as a stable funding source (Egan et al., 2017, 2022; Benetton et al., 2025; Hanson et al., 2015). Chen et al. (2022) and Chen et al. (2024) show that bank transparency and

²Pennacchi (2006) and Acharya et al. (2010) examine the systemic consequences of mispriced premia.

³For additional related work on the design and consequences of deposit insurance internationally and historically, see Calomiris and Jaremski (2016); Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2014); Ioannidou and Penas (2010); Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002); Allen and Gale (1998); Keister (2016); Jaremski and Schuster (2024); Huberdeau-Reid and Pennacchi (2024).

liquidity transformation shape deposit flows, with stronger sensitivities for uninsured deposits.⁴ Our paper is most closely related to Drechsler et al. (2017), and introduces a complementary subsidy channel in which variation in the value of deposit insurance shapes deposit supply alongside the market-power mechanism.

Third, our paper is closely related to prior research on depositor behavior at distressed banks and the role of deposit insurance in shaping deposit dynamics. Billett et al. (1998) document that banks substitute toward insured deposits following credit-rating downgrades, dampening market discipline, and Flannery and Sorescu (1996), O'hara and Shaw (1990), and Calomiris and Mason (1997) provide complementary evidence that uninsured creditors discipline bank risk-taking. A theoretical literature models depositor runs as coordination failures (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). Empirical work uses depositor-level and bank-level data to trace responses to bank distress, too-big-to-fail expectations, and crisis episodes (Iyer and Puri, 2012; Iyer et al., 2016; Egan et al., 2017; Iyer et al., 2019; Acharya and Mora, 2015; Jiang et al., 2024).⁵ In a closely related work, Martin et al. (2026) document that distressed banks attract insured deposits while paying higher rates. Distressed banks face greater regulatory scrutiny, and separating a regulator's incentive from the bank's incentive is difficult when a bank is close to failure. For example, regulators might be incentivized to lower the cost of failure by finding a suitable bank to acquire the failing banks.

2 History of Deposit Insurance Premiums

Following the Great Depression, the U.S. Congress created the FDIC to guarantee deposits, offering uniform protections up to a statutory limit (currently \$250,000 per depositor per bank). These protections are operationalized through the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund, to which each institution pays quarterly premiums (calculated as the assessment rate multiplied by the assessment base). In its early decades, the FDIC charged a flat assessment rate; every bank paid the same

⁴For surveys and additional related work on bank funding constraints, liquidity creation, banking-sector transmission, and depositor sensitivity, see Stein (1998); Kashyap and Stein (2000); Gorton and Winton (2003); Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993); Gorton and Pennacchi (1990); Fama (1985); Black (1975); Stein (2012); Gilje et al. (2016); Berger and Bouwman (2009); Drechsler et al. (2018, 2023); Acharya and Rajan (2024); Jiang et al. (2022); Xiao (2020); Kundu et al. (2021).

⁵For additional related work on the 2023 banking turmoil, see Cookson et al. (2023); Granja et al. (2024); Choi et al. (2023); Koont et al. (2023); Jiang et al. (2023); for failed-bank dynamics and other related work, see Correia et al. (2023); Granja (2023); Granja et al. (2017); Chang et al. (2023); Meiselman et al. (2023); Acharya et al. (2016); Limodio and De Roux (2023).

rate regardless of risk. After the Savings & Loan crisis in the 1980s, Congress enacted reforms that required the FDIC to hold reserves of at least 1.25% of insured deposits. The FDIC maintained a flat rate schedule to build toward that target, preserving much of its risk insensitivity.⁶

A subsequent regulation in 1991 required the FDIC to link insurance premiums to bank risk. The first risk-based assessments took effect on a transitional basis in 1993 and became permanent in 1994. Banks were categorized into three groups based on capitalization ratios and three groups based on supervisory ratings, yielding nine total categories for assessment. In practice, however, there was little variation in premiums paid: the rate ranged only from 23 to 31 basis points between the least and most risky banks.

By 1996, when the Deposit Insurance Fund had reached its 1.25% target, the vast majority of banks paid no insurance premium at all.⁷ This zero-premium regime persisted from 1996 through 2006. Although the FDIC continued to classify banks in a 3 by 3 matrix based on capitalization and supervisory ratings, institutions in the top category (well capitalized and highly rated) paid no assessment fees. In terms of deposits (number of institutions), more than 96% (92%) of banks fell into this safest category, effectively rendering the system risk-insensitive (Duffie et al., 2003).

The FDIC made a renewed effort to implement risk-based pricing in 2007. Banks were now grouped into four categories based on capital ratios and supervisory ratings, with assessment rates ranging from 5 to 43 basis points. Nevertheless, the majority of banks remained in the safest category, so variation in actual payments remained limited. In 2009, following the global financial crisis, the FDIC substantially revised its assessment methodology. Premiums were now based not only on capital and supervisory ratings but also on liability composition, such as the share of unsecured or brokered deposits. The framework also distinguished between large and small banks using a \$10 billion asset threshold. As a result, assessment rates varied more meaningfully, ranging from 7 to 77.5 basis points across institutions, and even within a given risk category depending on banks' liability structure. A subsequent 2016 reform adjusted the assessment base again, with premiums ranging from 1.5 to 40 basis points.

The magnitude of the deposit insurance subsidy remains an important empirical question. While a full quantitative assessment is beyond the scope of this paper, prior studies provide useful benchmarks. Duffie et al. (2003) use a reduced-form credit risk model to estimate the fair market

⁶For a more detailed historical survey, see "A Brief History of Reserves and Premiums".

⁷Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Press Release 87-96: "Under the existing rate schedule in effect since January of 1996, institutions in the lowest risk category will continue to pay no premiums during the first half of 1997. A total of 9,538, or 94.4% of all BIF-insured institutions, are in the lowest risk category."

value of deposit insurance premiums. They show that the fair market premium equals a bank's short-maturity credit spread multiplied by the ratio of expected losses to the insurer upon failure to expected fractional loss on bank debt. Based on credit default swap (CDS) spreads and corresponding insurance premiums in 2002, they estimate that the fair market premium could be as high as 64 basis points, a significant departure from the 0 to 3 basis points most banks actually paid.

Overall, the historical evidence points to a largely flat, risk-insensitive premium structure for most of U.S. banking history. Although the system became more risk-sensitive after 2007, it remains only partially so: premiums continue to be determined by coarse supervisory categories and do not adjust continuously with market-based measures of risk. Figure 1 illustrates this stability in practice. Average assessment rates across banks remain roughly constant in the years leading up to the Great Recession, with subsequent increases largely reflecting efforts to replenish the Deposit Insurance Fund rather than changes in bank risk, which is directly reflected in the bank CDS spreads. The figure also highlights that most shifts in assessment rates coincide with regulatory changes; these are usually uniform adjustments that move the entire schedule up or down, indicating the limited role of risk-based differentiation in the FDIC's pricing framework.

3 Data and Descriptive Statistics

We collect comprehensive data on bank balance sheet items from the quarterly Call Reports. First, we identify total domestic deposits from Schedule RC or RC-O and compute uninsured deposits that separately identify deposit amounts above the FDIC insurance threshold. Specifically, for 2001 and later, uninsured deposits are defined as the sum of RCON2710, RCONF051, and RCONF047, where RCON2710 captures deposits over \$100,000 prior to 2001, and RCONF051 and RCONF047 report deposits above \$100,000 and \$250,000, respectively, following the FDIC coverage expansion in 2008. We then define insured deposits as total domestic deposits minus estimated uninsured deposits.⁸ We additionally incorporate information on bank size (total assets), leverage and capitalization (total equity capital), and total loan portfolios as control variables. We compile branch-level deposit quantities from the FDIC's Summary of Deposits. We augment our baseline dataset with quarterly bank-level information on FDIC assessment fees available in the Call Reports, as well as publicly available aggregate data from the FDIC.

⁸For years before 2001, when disaggregated reporting was not available, we use the total domestic deposit base as the insured component, consistent with FDIC definitions at the time.

To examine how government subsidies affect deposit supply, we use various measures of asset risk (Merton, 1977) as proxies for the deposit insurance subsidy. Our main measure of bank risk is the quarterly LLP ratio, which is computed as provisions for credit losses on all financial assets and off-balance-sheet credit exposures (RIADJJ33) divided by total loans. Additionally, we supplement the forward-looking LLP measure with the NPL ratio, defined as the sum of nonaccruing loans and accruing loans that are 90 days or more past due divided by total loans.⁹ In robustness tests, we compute additional measures of asset risk. First, we compute two market-based risk measures: the quarterly average volatility of daily stock returns of publicly traded bank holding companies, and the implied bank bond interest rate spread over a maturity-matched treasury bond. The data for stock return volatility are accessed through CRSP and the data on bond spreads are obtained from S&P Global (formerly Markit). Second, we compute a book-based measure of asset volatility as the four-quarter standard deviation of the banks' return on assets. For our instrumental variables analysis, we use each bank's historical asset holdings across the following five categories: real estate loans, C&I loans, household & consumer loans, agricultural loans, and loans to other financial firms. Specifically, we compute a measure of estimated LLP ratio weighted by historical asset composition (portfolio weight for each bank in each asset class from the year the bank was chartered).

We also construct bank-level measures of insured deposit rates following Chen et al. (2022), defined as quarterly interest expense on deposits divided by average quarterly deposit balances. We report results using two variants of this measure. First, we follow Chen et al. (2022) and define the core insured deposit rate as the interest rate paid on transaction deposits, savings deposits, and small time deposits. Second, we construct an insured time deposit rate based solely on time deposits below the insurance limit. For both measures, insured deposits are defined as deposits below \$100,000 prior to 2008 and below \$250,000 thereafter. These insured deposit rate measures are available from 1997 to 2021 in our sample. Our insured deposit measure aligns closely with aggregate FDIC statistics and captures major regulatory transitions, such as the 2009 increase in the deposit insurance limit— see Appendix Figure A.1. Table 1 shows that the insured-to-total deposit ratio exhibits substantial cross-sectional dispersion across banks.

The sample period for our baseline analysis spans 1986 to 2023. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of key variables for the full sample period. We winsorize all variables at the 1% level

⁹In the Call Reports, we define NPL using RCFD1403 and RCFD1407. When these variables are missing from the Call Reports, we construct NPL by summing the by NPL by loan subcategories as defined in the FFIEC reporting forms ffiec.gov/resources/reporting-forms/ffiec031-historic.

to remove the effect of outliers. In the sample, the LLP ratio shows substantial variation, averaging 0.7% and ranging from near zero to almost 10%. The insured-to-total deposit ratio averages about 77%, indicating that most domestic deposits are protected under the FDIC guarantee. Therefore, insured deposits are economically large and an important source of bank funding. Consequently, the subsidy that banks can potentially enjoy through these deposits is economically large.

How large is the subsidy from potentially underpriced deposit insurance premiums? As Duffie et al. (2003) note, fair-market deposit insurance premia are approximately proportional to short-term credit spreads on bank debt. Using historical data, they estimate that the deposit insurance subsidy ranges from 40 to 90 basis points, depending on bank risk and assumptions about loss given default (see their Table 2). For a representative bank with an insured deposits to assets ratio of 60%, a 90 basis point subsidy translates into a reduction in funding costs of 0.54% of assets. Expressed in terms of return on equity, this implies an increase of more than 5 percentage points, which is economically large relative to typical bank ROEs of 10 to 20%. Although deposit insurance premia have become more risk sensitive over time, they remain only partially risk-based and continue to embed substantial subsidies, as shown in Figure 1. These magnitudes highlight the importance of deposit insurance subsidies in shaping deposit supply.

4 Deposit Insurance Subsidies and Deposit Supply

We develop a simple option-pricing model of a bank that funds a risky loan with insured deposits and equity. Because deposits are fully insured at a flat premium, the government guarantee embeds a put option on the bank's assets whose value rises with asset risk. Banks choose how much insured deposits to raise by trading off the marginal value of this guarantee against convex costs of funding (branch networks, staff, and other deposit-gathering expenses) and the insurance premium itself. The framework predicts that banks expand insured deposit supply when the value of deposit insurance subsidies increases.¹⁰

We test this prediction through several complementary empirical strategies. First, we exploit cross-sectional variation in bank risk using the LLP ratio as the measure of forward-looking asset volatility. Second, to address identification concerns, we employ two complementary strategies: (1) an instrumental variables strategy using shift-share variation in loan portfolio composition, and (2) an event study of banks approaching failure where reverse causality, i.e., insured deposits

¹⁰See Appendix A.1 for the complete theoretical derivation.

driving the asset riskiness, is ruled out by design. Third, we conduct robustness tests using alternative risk measures. Finally, we examine time-series patterns to assess whether the subsidy channel operates at the aggregate level.

4.1 Cross-Sectional Effects: Loan Loss Provisions

We begin our empirical analysis using the LLP ratio as our measure of bank risk. This choice reflects several economic and empirical considerations. From an economic perspective, LLP captures exactly what we aim to measure: managers' forward-looking, discretionary assessments of asset risk. When banks set aside provisions for potential future loan losses, they reveal their private information about portfolio quality and expected credit deterioration. This forward-looking dimension is important because the value of deposit insurance depends on expected future losses, not just realized past performance. The LLP ratio thus provides a direct mapping to the theoretical construct of asset volatility in our option-pricing framework.

From a practical standpoint, LLP also offers several important advantages. It is available for all banks in our sample from the Call Reports, providing comprehensive coverage across institutions and a long time series spanning nearly four decades. This extensive coverage allows us to observe how the subsidy channel operates across different monetary policy regimes, business cycles, and regulatory environments.

4.1.1 Baseline Specifications

Our baseline specification takes the form:

$$d_{b,t} = \alpha_b + \mu_t + \beta\sigma_{b,t-1} + \Sigma X_{b,t-1} + \epsilon_{b,t}. \quad (1)$$

where $d_{b,t}$ measures the log of insured deposits for bank b in quarter t and $\sigma_{b,t-1}$ is the one-quarter lagged LLP ratio. $X_{b,t-1}$ is a vector of time-varying bank characteristics. Bank fixed effects (α_b) control for all time-invariant bank characteristics such as management quality, geographic footprint and business model choices that might independently influence both risk-taking and deposit supply. Quarter-year fixed effects (μ_t) control for aggregate shocks affecting all banks simultaneously. We also include bank size decile by time fixed effects to account for differential trends in deposit growth across size groups to soak away the effects of banking regulations that typically vary by size.

Table 2 presents the results for the insured deposit fraction. Column (1) shows the OLS estimate without controls: a one standard deviation increase in the LLP ratio is associated with a 0.19 percentage point increase in the fraction of insured deposits relative to total deposits. The coefficient remains positive and significant after adding the lagged equity-to-assets ratio, loans-to-assets ratio, deposits-to-assets ratio, real estate loan share, and log assets in Column 2, as well as bank size decile by quarter-year fixed effects in Column 3, where the estimate is 0.16 percentage points. These control variables ensure that our results are not driven by leverage, deposit dependence, or the asset mix of the bank.

This compositional shift is consistent with our theoretical framework: when the marginal value of deposit insurance increases, banks disproportionately expand the deposits from which they most directly benefit. To unpack what drives this shift, Table 3 decomposes the response into its insured, uninsured, and total components.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show that banks with higher LLP ratios hold higher amounts of insured deposits. A one standard deviation increase in the LLP ratio is associated with a 0.3 to 0.5 percent increase in insured deposits, depending on the specification. This positive correlation is consistent with our hypothesis that banks expand insured deposit supply when the effective subsidy from deposit insurance increases.

In general, riskier banks should find it more difficult to attract deposits due to depositors' concerns about insolvency risk and panic runs. Our primary result that insured deposits increase with bank risk stands in sharp contrast to this conjecture, and establishes the importance of the deposit insurance channel we propose in the paper. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 confirm the conventional intuition for the uninsured segment: a one standard deviation increase in the LLP ratio is associated with a 1.0 to 1.4 percent decrease in uninsured deposits, consistent with depositors becoming more concerned about bank failure and withdrawing their uninsured funds.

A natural question arises: is the increase in insured deposits simply a reshuffling of old uninsured deposits to insured ones, or are banks attracting new insured deposits when they become riskier? A key institutional feature of the deposit insurance market makes it very unlikely that the old uninsured depositors are converting to insured deposits in the same bank: they simply cannot do so because the insurance coverage applies on a per depositor, per bank basis.

Therefore, uninsured depositors with large amounts of deposits in a bank with high LLP must go to other banks to obtain higher insurance. Likewise, a bank with high LLP must attract

new depositors as insured depositors.¹¹

Columns (5) and (6) examine total deposits. Column (5) shows that total deposits increase with the LLP ratio: a one standard deviation increase is associated with a 0.9 percent increase in total deposits, indicating that the rise in insured deposits more than offsets the decline in uninsured ones. Adding controls in Column (6) attenuates the effect to essentially zero (a coefficient of 0.000, statistically insignificant). Either way, banks do not lose their deposit base as they become riskier, in contrast to the standard intuition that deteriorating credit quality drives deposit outflows. These patterns are robust to specifying the outcome in growth rates rather than log levels in Appendix Table A.1; insured deposit growth rises with the LLP ratio, uninsured deposit growth falls, and total deposit growth is positive and significant even with the full set of controls, reinforcing that riskier banks do not lose their deposit base.

4.1.2 Deposit Pricing: Supply versus Demand

While our finding that riskier banks hold larger insured deposits is consistent with the subsidy hypothesis, adverse local conditions could confound the result, since deteriorating regional economies could simultaneously weaken bank credit quality and drive households toward safe deposit havens. Examining price responses alongside quantities resolves this ambiguity.

Since supply and demand shocks generate opposite price predictions, we use deposit rates to identify the mechanism. Rising deposit rates alongside higher quantities are consistent with an outward supply shift, whereas falling rates would indicate demand-driven growth. Our focus on insured deposit rates is particularly clean, since bank credit risk does not affect the pricing of insured deposits.

We test this prediction using data on deposit rates from the Call Reports. We focus on core deposits: savings, transaction, and time deposits below \$100,000 before 2008 and \$250,000 thereafter. We measure the interest rate paid on insured deposits following Chen et al. (2022). If our subsidy channel is correct, banks with higher LLP should offer higher rates on these products as they actively expand the supply of insured deposits.

Table 4 presents the results. A one standard deviation rise in the LLP ratio is associated with deposit rates that are 2.2 to 2.7 basis points higher, a 1.66% increase relative to the mean rate of 1.63%, and corresponding to around \$68 in additional interest expense on a \$250,000 deposit

¹¹Reciprocal deposits can be a mechanism through which depositors with large sums can still obtain more insurance while maintaining the relationship with one bank. However, this product witnessed significant growth only after 2018, i.e., it was not an economically large share of bank deposits in much of our sample period (Kim et al., 2024).

account. We obtain quantitatively similar results when examining rates exclusively on insured certificates of deposits, shown in Columns (4)-(6). This similarity across different deposit denominations strengthens our interpretation that banks are systematically adjusting their supply behavior in response to changes in subsidy values rather than targeting specific depositor segments.

Higher quantities alongside higher rates confirm an outward supply shift rather than demand-driven growth. Under any demand-side explanation, banks attracting stronger deposit inflows would have little reason to raise rates. The joint movement of price and quantity is precisely what the subsidy channel predicts.

4.1.3 Branch-Level Analysis

A potential concern with bank-level regressions is that we are unable to control for local economic conditions that a bank branch faces in raising deposits. Banks with deteriorating credit quality could be disproportionately located in regions where depositors have stronger preferences for insured deposits, or local economic conditions could simultaneously drive both deposit supply and loan performance.

To address these concerns, we exploit branch-level deposit data from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits, which allows us to control for local economic conditions. One caveat is that branch-level deposits are reported in aggregate, without separating insured from uninsured balances. Since riskier banks are likely to lose uninsured deposits, analyzing aggregate deposits at the branch-level makes it harder to find our subsidy effect.

Our branch-level specification takes the form similar to equation 1:

$$d_{i,b,c,t} = \alpha_i + \mu_{c,t} + \beta\sigma_{b,t} + \Sigma X_{b,t} + \epsilon_{i,b,c,t}. \quad (2)$$

where $d_{i,b,c,t}$ represents the log of total branch deposits of branch i of bank b , operating in county c in quarter-year t . The key independent variable, $\sigma_{b,t}$, is the LLP ratio. Branch and geography by time fixed effects (α_i and $\mu_{c,t}$, respectively) control for branch-specific and time-varying county- or state-specific factors. This saturation of fixed effects ensures that we are comparing branches in the same county or state, in the same quarter, operated by banks with different risk profiles. The identifying variation comes from the fact that a given county typically has branches from multiple banks, and these banks differ in their aggregate (not local) credit quality. $X_{b,t}$ includes control variables such as capitalization ratio, number of branches, and bank size.

Table 5 presents the results. Branches of banks with a one-standard-deviation higher LLP ratio experience a 1.4% increase in deposits. Adding state by quarter-year fixed effects in Column (2) leaves the estimate unchanged; the more granular county by quarter-year fixed effects in Column (3) raise it modestly to 1.86%. Local demand shocks and regional conditions do not drive our results.

Importantly, the county $\times$ quarter-year fixed effects in Column (3) completely absorb the deposits channel mechanism of Drechsler et al. (2017). The positive and significant coefficient on LLP shows that the subsidy channel operates through bank-level risk variation, independently of monetary policy effects, local market power, and their interaction.

Our results indicate that branches of riskier banks attract more deposits even when we compare them to branches of safer banks in the exact same location and time period. This pattern is difficult to reconcile with demand-side stories; instead, it is consistent with banks with higher subsidy values competing more aggressively for deposits by offering more attractive terms. In addition, the branch level analysis establishes that the total deposits, insured and uninsured combined together, increase in response to increased subsidy that banks receive through the deposit insurance.

4.1.4 Bank Capitalization and Insured Deposits

In our baseline model, leverage is held fixed as a comparative static and the deposit insurance put option value rises because asset volatility increases. However, LLP also shifts the put option value through a second channel: provisions reduce net income, which erodes equity capital and increases leverage, moving the bank closer to the default boundary even holding asset volatility constant. Appendix Table A.2 examines this channel directly by replacing LLP with bank capitalization as the key independent variable. The outcome variable in all columns is the fraction of insured deposits as a percentage of total deposits.

Consistent with the put option mechanism, lower equity ratios are associated with a higher insured deposit share across all specifications. A one standard deviation decrease in market equity to quasi-market assets is associated with a 1.09 percentage point increase in the insured deposit fraction, significant at the 1% level. Columns (4)-(6) show that book equity to book assets yields similarly signed and significant results, with magnitudes ranging from 0.22 to 0.82 percentage points per standard deviation depending on the specification.

These findings complement the LLP results in Table 2 and speak to a distinct channel through

which bank risk shifts the put option value. LLP captures the flow of new managerial information about forward-looking asset quality, the signal that maps directly to asset volatility in the option-pricing framework. The equity ratio captures the cumulative stock of past losses and the bank's current distance to default. Both shift the value of the deposit insurance put option through distinct channels, and both generate the predicted outward shift in insured deposit supply. The consistency across these two measures of bank risk strengthens our interpretation that the subsidy channel is the operative mechanism.

4.1.5 The Role of the Aggregate Risk Premium

So far, our tests exploit cross-sectional variation in bank-specific risk. The subsidy channel, however, predicts that the effect of bank risk on insured deposit supply should be amplified when the market price of risk is high, that is, in periods when a private insurer would charge a higher premium for the same level of bank-specific risk. Since the FDIC premium is essentially fixed, periods of elevated risk premia mechanically widen the gap between the market value of the deposit insurance guarantee and the premium paid, increasing the effective subsidy.

We test this prediction by interacting the LLP ratio with the time-series average of the aggregate bank bond spread, our proxy for the market-wide price of credit risk. Table 6 reports the results. The interaction term loads positively and significantly across all specifications. In our preferred specification in Column (3), a one standard deviation increase in the LLP ratio is associated with a 0.2% increase in insured deposits when the bond spread is at its mean, but the same increase generates a 0.5% expansion when the aggregate bank bond spread is one standard deviation above its mean, an amplification of roughly 150%. The compositional results in Column (6) are even more striking: the insured deposit fraction barely moves with LLP at average risk premia, but rises by 0.35 percentage points per standard deviation of LLP when the bond spread is one standard deviation above its mean.

This pattern is consistent with the predictions of the subsidy channel and is difficult to reconcile with alternative explanations such as bank market power or local demand conditions, neither of which should vary systematically with the aggregate price of risk. When a market insurer would charge more for the same exposure, banks expand their use of the underpriced FDIC guarantee more aggressively.

4.1.6 Margins of Adjustment: Pricing, Promotion, and Deposit Mix

A natural question is how banks operationally expand insured deposit supply when the subsidy rises. Banks influence the composition of their funding through three interrelated margins: pricing (the rates offered on small retail versus large wholesale deposits), product design (retail certificates of deposit, savings accounts, and transaction accounts), and distribution (branch networks and retail-oriented gathering channels). Because FDIC coverage applies on a per-depositor, per-bank basis, attracting a larger number of small retail accounts mechanically increases the insured share of a bank's deposit base. The point is not that banks directly control the insurance status of any given dollar, but that by tilting their funding mix toward retail customers they shift the composition toward insured deposits. Recent evidence in Benetton et al. (2025) documents that banks increasingly use non-rate promotional tools – cash bonuses, teaser rates, and targeted marketing – to compete for retail deposits, margins that our non-interest expense measure is designed to capture.

Table 7 decomposes the deposit response across product categories. The expansion documented in our baseline results is concentrated in time deposits, with insured time deposits accounting for the bulk of the inflow. A one standard deviation increase in the LLP ratio is associated with a 1.5% increase in insured time deposits and a smaller 0.4% increase in uninsured time deposits. Savings deposits, by contrast, decline modestly across both money market deposit accounts and other savings products. This pattern is consistent with depositors substituting from lower-rate savings accounts into higher-rate time deposits as banks raise CD rates to expand insured funding. A caveat is that the Call Reports do not disaggregate savings deposits by insurance status, so we cannot observe the insured-uninsured split within these categories; our baseline results using total insured deposits remain the cleanest mapping to the subsidy channel.

Table 8 examines pricing and non-rate costs of deposit gathering. We find a positive and significant effect of bank risk on non-interest expense, consistent with banks deploying additional promotional and branch-network resources to attract retail deposits when the subsidy rises. This is the margin emphasized by Benetton et al. (2025), who show that non-rate tools have become increasingly important in deposit competition. We also find a positive association between bank risk and uninsured deposit rates. Unlike insured deposits, uninsured deposits are exposed to bank credit risk, so riskier banks must compensate uninsured depositors with higher rates to retain them. The combination of higher non-interest expense, higher rates across both insured and

uninsured products, and a compositional shift toward insured time deposits together characterize how banks operationalize the supply expansion predicted by our framework.

5 Identification

Our results, especially the joint increase in quantity and interest rate, provide strong evidence of supply-side effects. Further, the branch-level regressions rule out local economic conditions as a driver of our findings. A remaining concern is reverse causality: banks with more insured deposits may choose to take more risk, knowing they are protected by government guarantees. The timing convention in our regression analysis makes this unlikely: we use the lagged LLP ratio and relate it to future financing decisions, making it unlikely that asset risk is responding to deposit financing.

Nonetheless, we address the concern further using two complementary approaches: (1) an instrumental-variables strategy that exploits variation in loan losses driven by macroeconomic shocks to different asset classes, holding loan portfolio choices fixed; and (2) an event study of banks approaching failure, where reverse causality is implausible.

5.1 Instrumental Variables: Loan Losses and Portfolio Composition

To break the reverse-causality channel noted above, we construct a shift-share instrument that isolates the variation in a bank’s loan losses coming only from aggregate shocks to the asset classes it chose to hold years earlier – variation that cannot be a response to its current deposit decisions. Constructing the instrument requires loss rates by asset class, which the Call Reports do not report for LLP. We therefore impute them: we regress bank-level LLP ratios on time fixed effects interacted with portfolio shares and take, for each category, the fitted loss rate implied when that category’s portfolio share equals 100%.

Our instrument exploits two sources of variation: each bank’s historical loan portfolio composition across different asset classes, and subsequent economy-wide shocks to credit quality within those classes. The construction follows a shift-share design. For each bank, we take its loan portfolio composition from the first quarter in which it appears in the Call Reports. Specifically, we measure the initial loan share, $w_{b,i}$, across five major categories i : real estate loans, commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, household and consumer loans, agricultural loans, and loans to

financial institutions.¹² We then fix these portfolio weights and compute a predicted LLP ratio (*PortfolioWeightIV*) for each subsequent quarter by multiplying $w_{b,i}$ by the time-varying imputed aggregate LLP rates in each asset class. ($s_{i,t}$).

$$\text{PortfolioWeightIV}_{b,t} = \sum_i w_{b,i} * s_{i,t}. \quad (3)$$

The intuition is straightforward. Banks make initial portfolio allocation decisions based on their expertise and local market conditions. These allocation decisions exhibit substantial persistence due to fixed costs, relationship banking, and the gradual nature of portfolio rebalancing. When macroeconomic conditions subsequently deteriorate for particular asset classes (e.g., commercial real estate downturn), banks with greater historical exposure experience larger increases in non-performing loans independent of their current portfolio decisions. This variation is plausibly exogenous because banks could not have anticipated the specific pattern of future credit shocks when making these initial allocation decisions. By including bank and time fixed effects in our regressions, we additionally absorb both permanent cross-bank differences and common macroeconomic shocks.

The first-stage results in Column (1) of Table 9 demonstrate that our instrument strongly predicts realized LLP ratios. A one standard deviation increase in *PortfolioWeightIV* is associated with a 0.25 percentage point increase in the realized LLP ratio. The instrument is highly significant, with a first-stage F-statistic of approximately 950, far above conventional weak-instrument thresholds. Even after absorbing variation through bank and time fixed effects, the instrument explains approximately 22% of the variation in LLP ratios.

Columns (2)-(4) examine log insured deposits as the outcome. Column (2) reports the reduced form: a one standard deviation increase in the instrument is associated with a 1.0% increase in insured deposits. In the second stage, a one standard deviation increase in the LLP ratio causes a 6.0% increase in insured deposits, controlling for bank size.

The IV estimate of about 6% exceeds the corresponding OLS estimate of 0.3–0.5% in Table 3 for two main reasons. First, measurement error in LLP, arising from managerial discretion and provision smoothing attenuates the OLS coefficient toward zero, and our Bartik instrument corrects this by isolating plausibly exogenous, macro-driven variation in loan losses. Second, the instrument captures systematic credit shocks because it is constructed from aggregate loss rates

¹²Since the data on agriculture loans became available after 1991, the regression model with the IV design is estimated on a slightly shorter time period from 1991 to 2023.

on different asset categories. The variation it isolates, therefore, reflects the systematic component of loan losses, which matters most for deposit insurance value through its effect on risk premia.

Columns (5)-(7) examine the insured deposit fraction. Column (5) reports the reduced form: a one standard deviation increase in the instrument is associated with a 1.19 percentage point increase in the insured-to-total deposit ratio. The 2SLS estimates in columns (6) and (7) are 6.98 and 9.15 percentage points. This compositional result reinforces our interpretation that banks specifically expand the insured part of their liabilities where the government guarantee provides the most value. For a bank with an average insured share of 83% (the sample mean reported in Table 1), a 6.98 percentage point increase corresponds to roughly a 8–11% relative rise in the insured fraction.

5.2 Event Study: Deposit Dynamics of Failed Banks

In our second test, we examine banks approaching failure – a setting in which risk clearly rises over time and the bank’s funding decision is primarily driven by their desire to exploit the value of insurance. Banks that ultimately fail experience deteriorating credit quality as their loans gradually sour. Importantly, by the time a bank is within a few quarters of failure, management typically operates under intense regulatory scrutiny and has little ability or incentive to expand risky lending.¹³ Any increase in non-performing loans during this period primarily reflects the realization of past lending decisions during better times rather than the effect of concurrent financing decisions on new risks (Correia et al., 2025). If we observe deposit expansion during this period, accompanied by rising deposit rates and a shift toward insured products, it would strongly support our interpretation that banks respond to increasing subsidy values by actively expanding their supply of insured deposits, even when their ability to manipulate asset risk is severely constrained.

We estimate the following event-study specification for the 568 banks that failed between 2000Q4 and 2023Q4:

$$y_{b,t} = \mu_t + \sum_{k=-17}^0 \beta_k \mathbb{1}[\text{Quarters to Failure} = k] + \epsilon_{b,t}. \quad (4)$$

where $y_{b,t}$ represents various deposit and asset quality measures for bank b in quarter t . The co-

¹³For instance, supervisory intervention such as consent orders, growth restrictions, and enhanced monitoring constrains new originations. Management can additionally face heightened personal liability and reputational loss.

efficients β_k trace the evolution of these measures as banks approach failure, with quarter zero representing the last quarter before failure. We include time fixed effects (μ_t) to control for aggregate trends. We examine behavior over the 17 quarters (approximately four years) preceding failure.

Figure 3 presents the results across six dimensions, while Table 10 reports selected coefficients at key event-time periods (-16, -12, -8, -4, and 0 quarters before failure). We find that the NPL ratio increases nearly monotonically from close to zero at 16 quarters before failure to approximately 10% in the quarter immediately preceding failure. The steady, gradual nature of this deterioration is important as it reflects the cumulative realization of credit losses rather than discrete strategic risk-taking episodes. LLP ratios (also shown in Panel (a), red line, and Column 7 of the table) follow a similar but slightly more volatile pattern, rising from near zero to about 1.2% by the quarter before failure. The correlation between NPL and LLP dynamics validates both as measures of asset quality deterioration, though the smoother trajectory of NPL as a realized stock variable (rather than a discretionary flow measure) makes it particularly suitable for this event study analysis.

The deposit composition dynamics, shown in Panel (b), are striking. The fraction of time deposits under \$100,000 relative to total domestic deposits rises by 6.8% in the final quarter before failure. This dramatic shift toward smaller insured deposits indicates that failing banks strategically target the deposit segment where government guarantees provide the most value. The pattern is not confined to the final few quarters but emerges gradually over the entire pre-failure period, accelerating as bankruptcy approaches. Panel (c) confirms this compositional shift from a different angle: the ratio of insured to total domestic deposits increases by 3 percentage points, with the increase concentrated in the final 12 quarters.

Importantly, we find that total deposits increase substantially as subsidy values rise. Panel (d) shows that log insured deposits increase by approximately 35% from 16 quarters before failure to the final quarter, while Panel (e) shows that log total deposits increase by approximately 33%. These are large economic magnitudes: failed banks increase their total deposits by about one-third in the five years before failure, even as their credit quality systematically deteriorates. This finding is critical for interpreting our mechanism. Despite facing severe financial distress and rising NPL ratios, these banks do not experience deposit outflows; instead, they actively expand their deposit base. The slightly faster growth of insured deposits relative to total deposits confirms that banks strategically emphasize the insured segment where the subsidy is most valuable, but the key result

is that total deposits grow substantially rather than contract. This expansion occurs precisely when subsidy values are increasing most rapidly, providing strong evidence that banks respond to higher subsidies by competing aggressively for deposits rather than passively accepting deposit flight.

The fact that total deposits expand (rather than contract) during the pre-failure period rules out several alternative interpretations. If our results simply reflected uninsured depositors fleeing risky banks (a pure demand-side story), we would observe declining total deposits even as the insured fraction mechanically increased. Instead, the growth in total deposits indicates that banks actively supply more deposits by offering attractive terms, and this supply expansion more than offsets any flight by uninsured depositors. The deposit expansion occurs even as asset quality systematically deteriorates, ruling out the interpretation that deposit growth simply reflects bank health or business expansion.

The pricing evidence in Panel (f) further supports a supply-side interpretation of deposit growth. Banks approaching failure offer substantially higher rates to attract deposits, with the 12-month CD rate rising from 11 basis points above baseline at 16 quarters before failure to 27-38 basis points in quarters -8 through -4. This increase is steepest in the middle period (quarters -12 through -4), coinciding with the fastest growth in total deposits and the largest shifts in deposit composition. Such rising rate premia are difficult to reconcile with demand-driven explanations, under which banks experiencing stronger deposit demand could maintain or lower rates. Instead, the joint increase in quantities and rates indicates an outward shift in deposit supply, consistent with banks actively expanding insured deposit supply as subsidy values increase.

Several features of these dynamics merit emphasis. First, the patterns emerge gradually over multiple years, not suddenly in the final quarters. The NPL ratio begins rising 16-20 quarters before failure, total deposit expansion accelerates steadily, and rate premia grow from 11 to 38 basis points between quarters -16 and -8. This gradual evolution rules out alternative explanations based on last-minute revelation of information or sudden panic by depositors. If depositors were reacting to discrete information events, we would see discontinuous jumps in deposit flows and rates; instead, the smooth trajectories suggest a systematic supply-side response by banks as subsidy values gradually increase. Second, the strong positive relationship between NPL ratios and deposit quantities as well as rates matches our subsidy channel and the supply-side interpretation. Third, the disproportionate growth of insured relative to total deposits confirms that banks prioritize the insured segment where the government guarantee is most valuable.

While it is true that our event study sample of failed banks is not necessarily representative, it is important to note that we are not attempting to estimate the magnitude of the subsidy effect for the average bank. Rather, we use it as a well-identified setting where reverse causality is ruled out. The fact that we observe the predicted patterns validates our interpretation of the cross-sectional results in Tables 2-9.

5.3 Aggregate Effects and Time-Series Evidence

In this section, we examine whether aggregate banking sector risk influences total deposit supply through the subsidy channel. If the subsidy channel operates at the system level rather than just across individual banks, it has clear implications for monetary-policy transmission and financial stability.

Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots year-over-year changes in aggregate insured deposits against changes in the aggregate LLP ratio. Using year-over-year changes ensures that our deposit supply measure is not affected by seasonal variation in banks' accounting practices. The two series are strongly positively correlated, at 51%. Because insured deposits are the segment most directly benefiting from government guarantees, this strong comovement supports our subsidy channel and suggests the aggregate effect operates primarily through compositional shifts toward insured products. By contrast, aggregate total deposit growth bears only a weak relationship to LLP, reinforcing that the channel runs through insured rather than total deposits.¹⁴ In Panel (b) of Figure 2, the spread of insured deposit rates over the federal funds rate exhibits a negative correlation of -62% with the LLP ratio. This pricing pattern at the aggregate level mirrors our findings from Table 2, confirming that when insurance subsidies increase, banks compete more aggressively for deposits and reduce spreads. Appendix Table A.3 formalizes these relationships. We control for changes in the Fed Funds rate and Fed balance sheet size to account for the deposits channel and reserves channel (Drechsler et al., 2017; Acharya and Rajan, 2024), though a time-series regression cannot absorb all confounding forces. Our panel specification remains the paper's primary empirical evidence.

At the aggregate level, total deposit growth shows no meaningful relationship with LLP, as losses in uninsured deposits offset gains in insured ones. Column (2) confirms a strong positive relationship between LLP and insured deposit growth, and Column (3) shows the pricing effect:

¹⁴With alternative risk measures, total deposit growth shows somewhat higher but still modest correlations: 19% with bond credit spreads and 34% with implied volatility in Appendix Figure A.2a.

banks pay higher rates on insured deposits when aggregate loan losses are elevated. Together, these results confirm that the subsidy channel operates at both the bank and system levels. We discuss the macroeconomic and financial stability implications further in Section 6.

5.4 Robustness

5.4.1 High-Frequency Measures of Bank Risk

Our main results use LLP and NPL as measures of bank asset risk. While these accounting-based measures have important advantages, they also have limitations: LLP reflects managerial discretion and may be subject to earnings management or smoothing, while NPL depends on classification decisions and charge-off timing. To address these concerns, we study the subsidy channel using alternative measures of bank risk. First, we use implied volatility from one-year at-the-money equity options, which reflects market expectations of future equity volatility for publicly traded bank holding companies. Second, we use banks' bond spreads over maturity-matched Treasury securities, which capture credit risk as perceived by debt investors. Third, we compute a book-based measure of asset volatility: the four-quarter rolling standard deviation of return on assets (ROA).

Table 11 presents the results. Column (1) shows that banks with a one-standard-deviation higher implied equity volatility hold 1.9% more insured deposits. Since market-based risk measures can be confounded by leverage, asset composition, and bank size, Column (2) controls for these variables; the coefficient remains significant. Columns (3) and (4) use bond spreads as the bank risk measure: a one standard deviation higher spread is associated with 12.9% or 10.3% more insured deposits. The larger magnitude likely reflects that bond spreads more directly capture default risk, the core determinant of deposit insurance value, whereas equity volatility also reflects upside uncertainty. The results remain significant despite the small samples of banks with actively traded bonds or options. Figure 4 displays the relationship between aggregate insured deposit growth and our alternative risk measures. Insured deposit growth and bank bond spreads (implied volatility) exhibits a strong positive correlation of approximately 41% (60%).¹⁵ Overall, we confirm that insured deposits increase during high-risk periods when insurance subsidies are most valuable.

Appendix Figure A.2a provides additional evidence that the deposit-risk relationship op-

¹⁵Appendix Figure A.3 examines the relation with CDS spreads, finding a correlation of 31%.

erates through our proposed subsidy channel. Panel (a) examines total deposit growth, showing correlations of 19% with bank bond spreads and 34% with implied volatility. These weaker relationships for total deposits compared to insured deposits reinforce our earlier finding that the subsidy channel operates primarily through compositional shifts toward insured products rather than through overall deposit expansion. Panel (b) examines deposit spreads, showing strong negative correlations with both risk measures (-55% for bank bond spreads and implied volatility). This pricing pattern at the aggregate level, shown in Appendix Figure A.2b, mirrors our cross-sectional results in Table 2 and confirms that the subsidy mechanism operates consistently across both individual banks and the banking system as a whole.

These robustness results have two important implications. First, they demonstrate that our findings are not an artifact of accounting measurement or managerial discretion. Second, the consistency across different risk measures strengthens our interpretation that we are capturing variation in true economic risk (the underlying volatility of bank assets) rather than noise or idiosyncratic features of particular accounting treatments. The fact that implied volatility, bond spreads, and accounting based measures all predict similar deposit responses provides confidence that our mechanism is robust.

It is worth noting the limitations of these alternative measures. They are available only for publicly traded bank holding companies (a small fraction of our sample) and for limited time periods, restricting statistical power. They also mechanically incorporate leverage, as higher deposits raise leverage and thereby increase both equity volatility and bond spreads. We address this concern by controlling for the equity-to-assets ratio in all specifications, but some mechanical correlation may remain. Despite these caveats, the alignment between accounting and market-based measures indicates that our findings reflect genuine economic forces rather than measurement artifacts.

5.4.2 Excluding Headquarters Branches: Approximating Insured Deposits

Our branch-level analysis in Table 5 uses total branch deposits as the outcome variable, combining both insured and uninsured components. While we would ideally examine insured deposits at the branch level, the Summary of Deposits data does not disaggregate deposits by insurance status at the branch level. However, we can construct an approximation by exploiting differences in deposit composition between headquarters and non-headquarters branches.

According to the Summary of Deposits reporting instructions, deposits should generally be

assigned to the office in closest proximity to the account holder’s address. However, the instructions recognize that “certain classes of deposits and deposits of certain types of customers may be assigned to a single office for reasons of convenience or efficiency.” In practice, this means that brokered deposits, internet deposits, and other large wholesale deposits, which are more likely to exceed FDIC insurance limits, are often assigned to the headquarters branch regardless of where the depositor is located. Consequently, headquarters branches tend to have disproportionately large average deposit balances and higher concentrations of uninsured deposits, while non-headquarters branches serve primarily retail customers with smaller, fully-insured deposits (see Kundu et al. (2021) for details on the geographic concentration of deposits).

By excluding headquarters branches, we effectively isolate branches that predominantly gather retail deposits, most of which fall below the FDIC insurance threshold. This provides an indirect test of whether our results are driven by insured deposits, specifically. If the subsidy channel operates primarily through insured deposits, as our theory predicts, we should observe similar effects when we exclude headquarters branches and focus on predominantly-insured retail deposits. Appendix Table A.4 presents the results. The similarity of results when focusing on retail-oriented branches provides additional evidence that the subsidy channel operates through insured deposits.

6 Interest Rate Sensitivity and Monetary Policy Transmission

Our findings have implications for monetary policy transmission through the banking sector. The deposits channel (Drechsler et al., 2017) shows that bank market power shapes deposit supply responses to rate changes: banks decrease deposit supply and widen spreads in high-rate environments, exploiting their market power. Our subsidy channel provides an independent mechanism through which monetary policy affects deposit supply. In our model, the connection between interest rates and deposit insurance value operates through two channels, as detailed in Appendix A.1. First, policy rates and bank risk are negatively correlated: the Federal Reserve typically lowers rates during economic downturns when credit risk is elevated. We confirm this pattern in Appendix Figure A.4, which plots the Fed Funds rate against the aggregate LLP ratio from 1986 to 2021. The negative correlation of approximately -53% is visually apparent and economically intuitive. During the 2001 recession, 2008-09 financial crisis, and 2020 pandemic, the Fed aggressively cut rates precisely when banking sector provisions spiked. This negative cor-

relation implies that periods of low interest rates coincide with high deposit insurance subsidies through the risk channel.

Second, interest rates can affect the value of the deposit insurance put option in an economy where deposits provide liquidity services to the consumers. In periods of scarce liquidity in the aggregate financial system, the value of liquidity provided by the deposit contracts is likely to be relatively higher compared to periods with abundant liquidity. Periods of low liquidity are characterized in our model as periods of high interest rates. For example, in an economy with limited reserves in the banking system, aggregate liquidity is expected to be low and the interest rates high. Therefore, depositors are willing to pay more for liquidity services, i.e., accept relatively lower interest rate, in periods of high interest rate. As a result, the value of the default option of the bank goes down when interest rates are high. Consequently, the value of deposit insurance premium decreases when interest rates are high, i.e., the subsidy comes down in high interest rate regime. As a result, banks are less willing to supply deposits in high interest regime.

Both these forces imply that the deposit supply curve shifts outward when interest rates fall, operating independently of banks' market power in local deposit markets.

6.1 Distinguishing the Subsidy Channel from the Deposits Channel

To establish that our subsidy channel is distinct from the deposits channel, we study both mechanisms in a single regression specification. The deposits channel operates through the interaction of Federal Funds rate changes (ΔFF) and local market concentration (HHI): when the Fed lowers rates, banks in concentrated markets increase the supply of deposits by paying relatively higher interest rates (as a deviation from the Fed Funds rate as in Drechsler et al. (2017)). Since both the Fed Funds rate and local market structure vary at the county-time level, the inclusion of county $\times$ quarter-year fixed effects in our earlier regressions completely absorb this interaction ($\Delta FF_t \times HHI_{c,t}$), absorbing the deposits channel mechanism.

In this section, we drop the county $\times$ quarter-year fixed effects, and directly include ($\Delta FF_t \times HHI_{c,t}$) as an additional regressor in the model. Table 12 presents the results using branch-level deposit growth as the outcome variable. Column (1) reproduces the deposits channel result: the coefficient on $\Delta FF \times HHI$ is negative and significant (-0.91), indicating that when the Federal Reserve lowers rates (negative ΔFF), banks in concentrated markets (high HHI) experience larger deposit inflows. This confirms the market power mechanism. Column (2) adds the change in the LLP ratio (ΔLLP) to the specification. The deposits channel coefficient becomes stronger (-

1.25), while ΔLLP enters with a positive and significant coefficient (0.010): branches affiliated with banks experiencing larger provision increases also experience higher deposit growth, even controlling for interest rate movements and HHI. The fact that both variables remain significant indicates they capture distinct mechanisms.

The key test comes in Columns (5) and (6), which include county $\times$ quarter-year fixed effects. These fixed effects completely absorb the $\Delta FF \times HHI$ interaction, eliminating the deposits channel by construction, as these variables are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects. Yet ΔLLP remains positive, significant, and economically meaningful (coefficient of 0.011 in Column 6). This result demonstrates that our subsidy channel operates through bank-level risk variation that is orthogonal to local market power and monetary policy effects.

Moreover, our most conservative specifications in the cross-sectional analysis (Tables 2, 5, and 9) include quarter-year fixed effects that absorb the level of the federal funds rate and other aggregate time-varying factors. The fact that LLP and NPL ratios remain significant predictors of deposit supply in these specifications further confirms that the subsidy channel operates through bank-specific variation in risk rather than merely reflecting the aggregate correlation between interest rates and banking sector risk.

6.2 Broader Implications

The literature on deposit insurance focuses almost exclusively on the asset side: how insurance encourages excessive risk-taking in loan portfolios (Keeley, 1990). Our results show that banks also optimize their liability structure in response to subsidy variation, actively expanding insured deposit supply when subsidies increase. This liability-side response has three implications.

First, it raises the fiscal cost of deposit insurance. When aggregate risk rises, the expected payout from the insurance fund increases and banks simultaneously expand insured deposits (Figure 2), amplifying the fiscal burden. Policymakers should account for this endogenous liability expansion, not just the mechanical increase in expected losses.

Second, the subsidy channel has implications for financial stability. During stress, the deposit insurance subsidy allows distressed banks to keep attracting deposits by offering higher rates. While this may prevent runs in the short run, it can delay insolvency recognition and enable weak banks to take excessive risks. The failed bank event study illustrates this: banks approaching failure expanded deposits substantially in the years before collapse.

Third, our results inform debates about deposit insurance design. Current FDIC premiums adjust for bank risk, but as documented in Section 2, this adjustment is coarse. Even imperfect risk-based pricing generates substantial variation in effective subsidies, and banks respond by adjusting deposit supply. Premiums that fully reflect market value could dampen these supply responses and reduce distortions in banks' liability choices.

Fourth, our results speak to the role of banking supervision. Supervisors can directly constrain deposit growth at distressed banks through consent orders, brokered deposit restrictions, and Prompt Corrective Action triggers. Yet the substantial insured deposit expansion we document in the years before failure suggests these tools are not fully binding in practice. The subsidy channel creates pressure for insured deposit growth precisely when supervisors would most want to restrain it, and supervisory frameworks may need to explicitly account for these subsidy-driven incentives rather than relying on market discipline alone.

7 Conclusion

This paper identifies a novel channel through which government guarantees shape deposit supply: the deposit insurance subsidy. Modeling deposit insurance as a put option, we show that the subsidy varies with bank risk and macroeconomic conditions, particularly changes in aggregate banking sector risk. Since FDIC premiums do not fully adjust to reflect shifts in the market value of this guarantee, the effective subsidy changes with bank risk. Using data on U.S. banks from 1986 to 2023, we document that banks expand deposit supply in response to increases in subsidy value.

The subsidy channel also has implications for financial stability. Because banks expand insured deposit supply as risk rises, the fiscal cost of deposit insurance is higher than models assuming a fixed deposit base. Policymakers should account for the additional deposits that distressed banks raise to exploit subsidy value. Our findings present a novel challenge to deposit insurance pricing models: the quantity of insured liabilities is endogenous to asset risk, a feature that practically all existing models ignore.

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Figures






Figure 1: FDIC Assessment Rates and Bank Risk

Notes: This figure plots the relationship between the annualized FDIC deposit insurance assessment rates levied on commercial banks and the bank CDS spread between 2001Q1 and 2024Q4. The grey shaded region denotes recessions.
Source: Call Reports, FDIC, Markit.



(a) Insured deposits and LLP Ratio




(b) Insured Deposit Rate Spread and LLP Ratio

Figure 2: Insured Deposits and Loan Loss Provisions


Notes: This figure plots the relation between year-over-year quarterly insured deposit growth rates and the LLP Ratio. Panel (a) plots the growth of total deposits, Panel (b) plots the growth of insured deposits, and Panel (c) panel plots the average insured deposit rate spread over the fed funds rate.

Source: Call Reports.


Figure 3: Event Study: Dynamics of Bank Deposits for a Sample of Failed Banks




(a) NPL and Loan Lease Loss Provisions




(b) Time Deposits ≤ \$100k / Deposits




(c) Insured Deposit Fraction



(d) ln(Insured Deposits)



(e) ln(Deposits)



(f) CD Deposit Rate

Notes: This figure presents estimates from event-study regressions examining the dynamics of deposit and asset quality measures for failed banks in the 17 quarters preceding failure. Each panel plots coefficients from a separate regression of the form $y_{it} = \sum_{k=-17}^0 \beta_k \mathbb{1}[\text{Quarters to Failure} = k] + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}$, where γ_t represents calendar quarter fixed effects. The x-axis shows quarters relative to bank failure (quarter 0 is the last quarter before failure). Panels (a)–(f) show, respectively: the ratios of non-performing loans (blue) and loan-loss provisions (red) to total loans; the share of time deposits under \$100,000 in total domestic deposits; the insured share of total domestic deposits; the natural log of total insured deposits; the natural log of total domestic deposits; and the bank's 12-month CD rate. Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are two-way clustered by bank and quarter-year to account for serial correlation within banks and common shocks across banks in the same time period. There are a total of 568 failed banks from 2000Q4 through 2023Q4.




Figure 4: Insured Deposits Growth and Alternative Measures of Bank Risk

Notes: This figure plots the relation between the year-over-year quarterly insured deposit growth rates and alternative measures of bank risk. The alternative measures of bank risk include the bank bond interest rate spread over a maturity-matched treasury bond, the implied volatility from options on the banks' equity.

Source: Call Reports.

Tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	P25	P50	P75	Max	N
LLP Ratio	0.612	1.36	-0.717	0.000	0.221	0.568	9.817	1168382
Insured Deposits to Total Deposits	83.372	13.38	0.000	78.172	86.512	92.420	99.930	976777
Core Deposit Rate	1.632	1.20	0.100	0.599	1.372	2.422	4.863	496109
Insured Deposit Rate	3.020	1.78	0.287	1.373	2.809	4.673	6.489	602302
Implied σ	0.337	0.21	0.026	0.235	0.282	0.367	7.258	25353
<i>PortfolioWeightIV</i>	0.596	0.47	-0.498	0.328	0.494	0.803	2.283	1165700
<i>NPLRatio</i>	1.660	2.21	0.000	0.284	0.894	2.097	12.412	1170998
Book Equity to Book Assets	10.234	3.93	4.088	7.874	9.375	11.477	29.766	1175102
Loans to Assets	57.499	15.93	14.075	47.476	59.329	69.148	86.592	1175102
$\sigma(ROA)$	0.001	0.00	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.002	0.017	1164135
Bank Bond Spread	0.012	0.01	0.000	0.006	0.008	0.013	0.145	7653

Notes: LLP Ratio is the annualized quarterly loan loss provision over total loans. Core deposit rate is the annualized two-quarter average of interest expense on transaction, savings, and insured time deposits over the quantity of these amounts. Insured deposit rate is the annualized two-quarter average of interest expense on insured time deposits over the quantity of these amounts. Implied σ is the rolling one-year implied volatility of sample banks' equity returns using Optionsmetric. *PortfolioWeightIV* is the shift-share instrument constructed by multiplying a bank's earliest available lagged portfolio weights across five asset classes by the aggregate NPL levels in those asset classes. NPL ratio is defined as the sum of nonaccrual loans and accruing loans that are past due by more than 90 days divided by total net loans. $\sigma(ROA)$ is the standard deviation of the banks' lagged four quarters of return on assets. Bank Bond Spread is the banks' average bond yield minus maturity-matched treasury bonds.

Source: OptionMetrics, Call Reports, TRACE, FISD.

Table 2: Bank Risk and Fraction of Insured Deposits

	Insured Fraction		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
L.LLP Ratio	0.185*** (7.48)	0.212*** (8.33)	0.158*** (6.26)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		-0.529*** (-7.70)	-0.562*** (-7.92)
L.Loans to Assets		0.203*** (2.60)	0.192** (2.49)
L.Deposits to Assets		2.427** (2.50)	2.131** (2.20)
L.Real Estate Loans		3.782*** (6.45)	4.098*** (7.06)
L.Log(Assets)		-4.842*** (-25.33)	-3.070*** (-7.29)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE			✓
Observations	967,961	967,961	967,961
R^2	0.76	0.77	0.77

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the LLP Ratio of a bank and the fraction of insured deposits in the bank's deposit base. The outcome variable in all columns is the fraction of insured deposits as a percentage of total deposits. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 3: Bank Risk and Deposit Quantities

	Log(Ins. Dep.)		Log(Unins. Dep.)		Log(Deposits)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L.LLP Ratio	0.005*** (2.68)	0.003*** (3.18)	-0.010*** (-4.29)	-0.014*** (-7.79)	0.009*** (6.59)	0.000 (0.30)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		0.016*** (5.77)		0.065*** (13.05)		0.026*** (9.03)
L.Loans to Assets		0.019*** (5.76)		0.028*** (5.10)		0.013*** (5.06)
L.Deposits to Assets		1.306*** (20.01)		1.027*** (15.39)		1.329*** (22.46)
L.Real Estate Loans		0.086*** (3.74)		-0.303*** (-7.51)		0.031 (1.55)
L.Log(Assets)		1.337*** (88.80)		1.569*** (61.93)		1.399*** (100.72)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE		✓		✓		✓
Observations	967,991	967,991	962,370	962,370	1,149,991	1,149,991
R^2	0.91	0.98	0.87	0.92	0.91	0.99

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the LLP Ratio of a bank and the bank's deposit quantities. The outcome variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the log of total insured deposits. The outcome variable in Columns (3) and (4) is the log of total uninsured deposits. The outcome variable in Columns (5) and (6) is the log of total deposits. Even-numbered columns include the lagged equity-to-assets ratio, loans-to-assets ratio, deposits-to-assets ratio, real estate loan share, and log assets as controls. All specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 4: Bank Risk and Insured Deposit Rates

	Core Deposit Rate			Insured CD Rate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L.LLP Ratio	0.022*** (11.64)	0.023*** (12.62)	0.027*** (15.11)	0.011*** (6.47)	0.014*** (8.73)	0.018*** (10.98)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		0.009** (2.02)	0.007 (1.48)		-0.021*** (-5.83)	-0.014*** (-3.66)
L.Loans to Assets		0.038*** (6.22)	0.038*** (6.07)		0.061*** (11.11)	0.062*** (11.29)
L.Deposits to Assets		0.121** (1.99)	0.052 (0.88)		-0.023 (-0.48)	0.003 (0.06)
L.Real Estate Loans		0.099** (2.18)	0.093** (2.03)		-0.023 (-0.59)	-0.042 (-1.09)
L.Log(Assets)		0.211*** (16.16)	0.187*** (9.35)		0.152*** (14.65)	0.161*** (8.92)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE			✓			✓
Observations	494,982	494,982	494,982	601,471	601,471	601,471
R^2	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.94	0.94	0.94

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the LLP Ratio of a bank and the bank's deposit rates. Deposit rates are constructed following Chen et al. (2022) as the annualized two-quarter average interest expense over deposits. Core deposit rate is the rate on transaction, savings, and insured time deposits. Insured CD rate is the rate on insured time deposits. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 5: Deposit Supply Effects Controlling for Local Conditions

	Log(Branch Deposits)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
L.LLP Ratio	0.014*** (3.08)	0.016*** (4.06)	0.019*** (4.59)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets	-0.045*** (-5.93)	-0.044*** (-7.40)	-0.043*** (-7.29)
L.Loans to Assets	0.025** (2.50)	0.028*** (2.89)	0.027*** (2.86)
L. No. Branches	-0.041** (-2.02)	-0.046*** (-2.89)	-0.046*** (-3.04)
L.Log(Assets)	0.041** (2.11)	0.036** (2.15)	0.029* (1.73)
L.Real Estate Loans	0.104 (1.32)	0.036 (0.48)	0.084 (1.14)
L.Deposits to Assets	0.167** (2.25)	0.227*** (4.17)	0.224*** (4.19)
Branch FE	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile × Time FE	✓	✓	✓
State × Time FE		✓	
County × Time FE			✓
Observations	1,683,012	1,682,984	1,677,099
R ²	0.8950	0.8975	0.9053

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between a bank's LLP Ratio and branch-level deposit quantities, measured as log total deposits. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects, branch state by year-quarter fixed effects, and branch county by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company. *Source:* Call Reports, Summary of Deposits.

Table 6: Bank Risk and Insured Deposits and Risk Premium

	Log(Ins. Dep.)			Insured Fraction		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L.LLP Ratio $\times$ L.Agg. Bank Bond Spread	0.038*** (19.53)	0.003*** (3.26)	0.003*** (3.02)	0.328*** (9.76)	0.385*** (11.37)	0.352*** (10.34)
L.LLP Ratio	-0.021*** (-6.36)	0.003** (2.40)	0.002* (1.81)	0.040 (1.12)	0.038 (1.01)	-0.005 (-0.14)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		0.016*** (5.04)	0.013*** (4.68)		-0.553*** (-7.44)	-0.599*** (-7.78)
L.Loans to Assets		0.023*** (5.86)	0.022*** (5.54)		0.290*** (3.08)	0.265*** (2.84)
L.Deposits to Assets		1.280*** (18.01)	1.255*** (19.19)		2.012** (1.98)	1.680* (1.67)
L.Real Estate Loans		0.068*** (2.59)	0.078*** (2.77)		3.806*** (5.71)	4.117*** (6.21)
L.Log(Assets)		1.322*** (216.95)	1.318*** (89.17)		-5.035*** (-23.17)	-3.317*** (-7.17)
L.Cash To Assets		-0.015 (-0.37)	-0.005 (-0.10)		1.011 (1.15)	0.818 (0.91)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE			✓			✓
Observations	809,675	809,675	809,675	809,643	809,643	809,643
R^2	0.92	0.98	0.98	0.77	0.78	0.78

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the interaction LLP Ratio and the aggregate bank bond spread of a bank and the bank's insured deposits. The outcome variable in Columns (1) - (3) is the log of total insured deposits. The outcome variable in Columns (4) - (6) is the fraction of insured deposits as a percentage of total deposits. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 7: Different Deposit Quantities

	Log(Saving Deposits)	Log(MMDA Saving Deposits)	Log(Other Saving Deposits)	Log(Time Deposits)	Log(Insured Time Deposits)	Log(Uninsured Time Deposits)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L.LLP Ratio	-0.008*** (-8.00)	-0.007*** (-4.42)	-0.023*** (-13.30)	0.013*** (6.01)	0.015*** (12.97)	0.004*** (2.63)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets	0.068*** (16.71)	0.079*** (14.43)	0.003 (0.60)	-0.019*** (-3.30)	-0.017*** (-4.97)	0.035*** (5.03)
L.Loans to Assets	-0.007 (-1.59)	-0.001 (-0.22)	-0.023*** (-3.56)	0.083*** (10.79)	0.033*** (7.67)	0.194*** (28.45)
L.Deposits to Assets	1.263*** (22.69)	1.172*** (15.91)	1.264*** (18.08)	0.942*** (10.11)	1.013*** (18.09)	0.311*** (2.80)
L.Real Estate Loans	-0.021 (-0.61)	0.036 (0.69)	0.021 (0.40)	0.347*** (6.06)	0.279*** (8.24)	-0.366*** (-6.72)
L.Log(Assets)	1.540*** (162.05)	1.664*** (122.44)	1.414*** (83.88)	1.505*** (90.01)	1.358*** (145.06)	1.416*** (87.83)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	1,139,223	1,091,928	1,079,786	506,702	1,142,767	727,768
R ²	0.96	0.92	0.91	0.94	0.94	0.89

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the LLP Ratio of a bank and alternative measures of the bank's deposit quantities. The outcome variables are the log of total savings deposits, money market deposit accounts (MMDA), other savings deposits, total time deposits, insured time deposits, and uninsured time deposits. The Call Reports do not disaggregate savings deposits into insured and uninsured components. Specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 8: Alternative Deposit Prices

	Other Noninterest Exp.		Uninsured CD Rate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
L.LLP Ratio	0.035*** (6.31)	0.033*** (6.27)	0.017*** (6.23)	0.025*** (9.13)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		-0.011 (-0.71)		-0.027*** (-5.70)
L.Loans to Assets		-0.020 (-1.20)		0.050*** (7.20)
L.Deposits to Assets		0.795*** (4.64)		-0.022 (-0.37)
L.Real Estate Loans		0.281** (2.33)		0.035 (0.74)
L.Log(Assets)		0.174*** (4.94)		0.117*** (9.76)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	116,102	116,102	438,159	438,159
Observations	0.83	0.83	0.86	0.86

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the LLP Ratio of a bank and alternative measures of the bank's deposit pricing and deposit-gathering costs. Deposit rates are constructed following Chen et al. (2022) as the annualized two-quarter average interest expense over deposits. Uninsured deposit rate is the rate on uninsured time deposits. Non-interest expense captures non-rate costs of gathering deposits, including promotional and branch-network expenditures, scaled by total assets. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 9: Instrumental Variables: LLP and Deposit Supply

	LLP Ratio	Log(Ins. Dep.)			Insured Fraction		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
L.Portfolio Weight IV	0.249*** (30.82)	0.010*** (4.87)			1.191*** (13.50)		
$L. \widehat{LLP}$			0.063*** (5.54)	0.060*** (3.30)		6.975*** (13.34)	9.145*** (12.19)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets	-0.007 (-1.47)	0.019*** (6.13)	0.017*** (5.86)	0.016*** (5.98)	-0.566*** (-8.41)	-0.498*** (-6.76)	-0.426*** (-5.46)
L.Loans to Assets	0.058*** (6.70)	0.020*** (5.59)	0.018*** (5.45)	0.017*** (5.05)	0.275*** (3.46)	-0.051 (-0.59)	-0.192** (-2.04)
L.Log(Assets)	0.017 (1.35)	1.324*** (222.15)	1.333*** (239.67)	1.338*** (91.27)	-4.871*** (-25.64)	-5.031*** (-25.81)	-3.475*** (-8.19)
L.Deposits to Assets	-0.548*** (-8.46)	1.277*** (19.41)	1.315*** (20.12)	1.294*** (21.62)	2.879*** (3.04)	4.799*** (4.79)	5.100*** (4.92)
L.Real Estate Loans	-0.567*** (-9.13)	0.082*** (3.79)	0.094*** (4.45)	0.104*** (4.73)	3.869*** (6.47)	6.239*** (9.35)	7.484*** (10.21)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE				✓			✓
Observations	962,020	964,885	962,020	962,020	964,856	961,990	961,990
Instrument F Stat	949.68						
R^2	0.22	0.98	0.82	0.47	0.76	-0.52	-1.00

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relationship between the LLP Ratio of a bank and the bank's insured deposits using an instrumental variable. PortfolioWeightIV is the shift-share instrument constructed by multiplying a bank's earliest available lagged portfolio weights across five asset classes by the aggregate LLP levels in those asset classes. The aggregate LLP level for each of these asset classes is estimated by regressing bank-level LLP ratios onto time fixed effects interacted with portfolio shares and obtaining the predicted value. The first stage is presented in column (1). $\widehat{LLPRatio}$ is the LLP Ratio instrumented by the lagged portfolio weights shift-share instrument. The outcome variable in Columns (2) - (4) is the log of total insured deposits. The outcome variable in Columns (5) - (7) is the fraction of insured deposits as a percentage of total deposits. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 10: Event Study: Deposit Dynamics of Failed Banks

Quarters to Failure	Outcome Variable						
	Time Dep. <\$100k/Dep.	12-Month CD Rate	Insured Fraction	Log(Insured Deposits)	Log(Total Deposits)	NPL Ratio	LLP Ratio
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
-16	0.0004 (0.11)	0.1133 (1.33)	-0.0038 (-1.21)	-0.0175 (-0.57)	-0.0052 (-0.17)	0.0008 (0.61)	0.0000 (0.01)
-12	0.0150* (1.72)	0.2804** (2.21)	-0.0005 (-0.06)	0.0750 (0.93)	0.0794 (0.96)	0.0038* (1.93)	0.0005 (1.06)
-8	0.0243** (2.24)	0.3821*** (2.93)	0.0024 (0.17)	0.1915** (2.14)	0.2014** (2.06)	0.0131*** (4.40)	0.0016*** (2.89)
-4	0.0372*** (2.94)	0.2926** (2.27)	0.0080 (0.50)	0.2917** (2.43)	0.2959** (2.28)	0.0419*** (10.11)	0.0046*** (5.09)
0	0.0675*** (4.28)	0.2680 (1.51)	0.0300* (1.83)	0.3544** (2.44)	0.3301** (2.13)	0.1004*** (14.33)	0.0121*** (5.31)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	8,463	804	8,463	8,463	8,464	8,461	8,443
R ²	0.18	0.93	0.35	0.11	0.12	0.49	0.20

t-statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: This table presents coefficients from event-study regressions examining the dynamics of deposit composition, quantities, pricing, and asset quality for 568 banks that failed between 2000Q4 and 2023Q4. Each column reports coefficients from a separate regression of the form $y_{b,t} = \sum_{k=-17}^0 \beta_k \mathbb{1}[\text{Quarters to Failure} = k] + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{b,t}$, where γ_t represents calendar quarter-year fixed effects. The table reports coefficients for selected event-time periods: -16, -12, -8, -4, and 0 quarters before failure (quarter 0 is the last quarter before failure). Time Dep. <\$100k/Dep. is the fraction of time deposits under \$100,000 relative to total domestic deposits (corresponds to Panel (b) of Figure 3). 12-Month CD Rate is the bank's offered rate on 12-month certificates of deposit (Panel (f)). Insured Fraction is the ratio of insured to total domestic deposits (Panel (c)). Log(Insured Deposits) is the natural logarithm of total insured deposits (Panel (d)). Log(Total Deposits) is the natural logarithm of total domestic deposits (Panel (e)). NPL Ratio is non-performing loans divided by total loans (Panel (a), blue line). LLP Ratio is loan loss provisions divided by total loans (Panel (a), red line). Standard errors are two-way clustered by bank and quarter-year to account for serial correlation within banks and common shocks across banks in the same time period.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 11: Alternative Measures of Bank Risk

	Log(Ins. Deposits)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
L. Implied σ	0.019** (2.45)	0.013* (1.77)		
L. Bank Bond Spread			0.129* (1.81)	0.103* (1.83)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		0.042 (1.39)		0.093 (1.30)
L.Loans to Assets		-0.113* (-1.96)		-0.142** (-2.54)
L.Log(Assets)	1.221*** (13.07)	1.311*** (19.43)	1.236*** (7.96)	1.311*** (9.53)
L.Deposits to Assets		2.982*** (3.53)		5.392*** (2.75)
L.Real Estate Loans		1.425*** (2.69)		2.117*** (4.84)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	23,361	23,361	6,614	6,614
R^2	0.95	0.96	0.94	0.94

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the bank's insured deposits and alternative measures of bank asset risk. Implied σ is the rolling two-year implied volatility of sample banks' equity returns using Optionsmetric. Bank Bond Spread is the banks' average bond yield minus maturity-matched treasury bonds. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table 12: Branch-Level Comparison with the Deposits Channel

	Deposit Growth					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta \text{FF} \times \text{HHI}$	-0.914** (-2.43)	-1.251*** (-3.78)	-1.146*** (-3.82)	-1.350*** (-4.62)		
HHI	0.066*** (2.73)	0.055*** (2.74)	0.051** (2.49)	0.040** (2.39)		
ΔLLP		0.010*** (6.92)		0.010*** (7.09)		0.011*** (6.94)
L.Log(Assets)	-0.010*** (-2.65)	-0.009** (-2.53)	-0.009** (-2.29)	-0.008** (-2.17)	-0.008* (-1.85)	-0.007* (-1.69)
Time FE	✓	✓				
Branch FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
State $\times$ Time FE			✓	✓		
County $\times$ Time FE					✓	✓
Observations	1,588,409	1,586,236	1,588,383	1,586,210	1,583,310	1,581,135
R^2	0.1600	0.1605	0.1668	0.1674	0.1996	0.2002

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the change in bank's LLP Ratio, Federal Funds rate changes, and branch-level deposit quantities. The outcome variable is the log of total branch deposits. ΔFF is the year-over-year change in the Federal Funds rate. HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, measuring local deposit market concentration at the county level. ΔLLP is the year-over-year change in the loan loss provision ratio. Column (1) replicates the deposits channel specification from Drechsler et al. (2017). Column (2) adds the change in the bank's LLP Ratio. Column (3) adds bank size controls and the HHI interaction term. Columns (4)-(6) progressively add more stringent fixed effects: Column (4) includes time and bank size decile $\times$ time fixed effects; Column (5) adds state $\times$ time fixed effects; Column (6) adds county $\times$ time fixed effects. All specifications include branch fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports, Summary of Deposits.

A Appendix

A.1 Model

We formalize our intuition in a model similar to Merton (1977) in this section. We consider a bank that issues D dollars of insured deposit and funds a loan of value $D+E$ where E is the equity value. Banks fund a fraction of their loans with equity such that $L = \frac{D}{w}$ so that $E = \frac{D}{w} - D$. w is the leverage ratio. We assume that there are no uninsured deposits in the bank's liability mix. In the baseline specification, deposits provide no liquidity or convenience service and therefore they simply earn the risk-free rate because they are insured: $r_d = r$, where r is the risk-free rate. We assume a maturity date of T for both loans and deposits to keep our analysis focused on our channel.

The loan market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, so banks simply maximize the value of the put option of deposit insurance net of any deposit insurance premium and the convex cost of raising deposits. Raising deposits incurs costs such as branch network operations, ATM network, maintenance cost, and staff cost; together, they are convex in the amount of deposits raised. Deposit insurance premium is paid today at a flat rate of $\bar{p}$ per unit of deposit. Although the deposit insurance premium is flat and constant over time, factors that move its market value such the volatility of bank assets, σ , or r are not. They change with macroeconomic conditions, policy choices, as well as bank-specific factors.

Banks' optimization problem is the following:

$$\max_{\{D\}} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] - \frac{1}{2}cD^2 - \bar{p}D \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where, $P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]$ denotes the value of a European put option on the underlying asset L with strike price K , the face value of deposits. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] &= Ke^{-rT}\Phi(-d_2) - L\Phi(-d_1) \\ d_1 &= \frac{\ln(\frac{L}{K}) + (r + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})T}{\sigma\sqrt{T}}; \\ d_2 &= d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T}; \\ K &= D \cdot e^{rT}; \\ \frac{L}{K} &= \frac{D}{wD \cdot e^{rT}} = \frac{1}{w \cdot e^{rT}}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Simplification of the above expressions lead to the following:

$$\begin{aligned} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] &= D\Phi(-d_2) - \frac{D}{w}\Phi(-d_1); \\ d_1 &= \frac{-\ln(w)}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} + \frac{\sigma\sqrt{T}}{2}; \\ d_2 &= d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

The first order condition of the bank's optimization problem in Equation A.1 can be written

as follows:

$$\frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial D} = cD + \bar{p} \quad (\text{A.4})$$

Simplifying further:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial D} &= \Phi(-d_2) + D \cdot \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial D} - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} - \frac{D}{w} \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial D} \\ &= \Phi(-d_2) - D\phi(-d_2) \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial D} - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} + \frac{D}{w} \phi(-d_1) \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial D} \\ &= \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the optimal quantity of deposits is given by the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} &= cD + \bar{p} \\ D^* &= \frac{1}{c} \left\{ \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} - \bar{p} \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Optimal supply of deposits decreases when marginal cost c is higher; and when deposit insurance premium paid, $\bar{p}$ is higher. It increases when the default option has a higher value.

Optimal supply as volatility changes: Now, using the envelope theorem, we find the sensitivity of optimal quantity of deposits with respect to asset volatility σ :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial \sigma} &= \frac{1}{c} \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} \left\{ \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} \right\} \\ &= \frac{1}{c} \left\{ -\phi(-d_2) \cdot \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial \sigma} + \frac{1}{w} \phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial \sigma} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Note:

$$\phi(-d_2) = \frac{1}{w} \phi(d_1) \quad (\text{A.6})$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial \sigma} &= \frac{1}{c} \left\{ -\frac{1}{w} \phi(d_1) \cdot \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial \sigma} + \frac{1}{w} \phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial \sigma} \right\} \\ &= \frac{\phi(d_1)}{cw} \left\{ -\frac{\partial d_2}{\partial \sigma} + \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial \sigma} \right\} \\ &= \frac{\phi(d_1)}{cw} \sqrt{T} > 0 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.7})$$

Therefore, banks supply more deposits when volatility goes up. Periods with higher macroeconomic volatility or bank-specific losses are likely to be associated with a higher supply of deposits.

A.1.1 Optimal supply as r changes:

Interest rates can affect deposit insurance value through two potential channels. First, policy rates are often lowered in bad economic times, producing a negative correlation between r and σ . Second, interest rates can affect the price of liquidity and therefore the premium depositors are willing to pay for liquidity benefits of deposits. We first present a model where r and σ are negatively correlated. Then we generalize the model to a setting with liquidity benefits.

A.1.2 Policy Rates

Interest rates in the economy follow a negative relation with the observed volatility of the banking sector. This is consistent with the idea that policy interventions often happen during bad economic times, when rates are lowered. We capture that intuition with a simple linear relation between volatility and interest rate as follows:

$$\sigma = \hat{b} - \hat{a} * r \quad (\text{A.8})$$

It follows that (Proof in the Appendix):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial r} &= \frac{1}{c} \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left\{ \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} \right\} \\ &= -\phi(d_1) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a}\sqrt{T}}{cw} \right\} < 0 \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.9})$$

Therefore, when interest rates go up, optimal deposit financing comes down. The sensitivity of optimal deposit supply to interest rate is high when a is high, i.e., when asset volatility is more sensitive to r . If we set this parameter to zero, we obtain Merton (1977) that the value of deposit insurance put option is insensitive to interest rates.

A.1.3 Liquidity Benefits of Deposits

So far, in our model, deposits are priced at the risk-free rate. We now extend our model to include the liquidity benefits of deposits that the consumers enjoy. On average, deposits pay lower interest rates than the risk-free rate because they come with liquidity benefits. In periods of scarce liquidity in the aggregate financial system, the value of liquidity provided by the deposit contracts is likely to be relatively higher compared to periods with abundant liquidity. Periods of low liquidity are characterized in our model as periods of high interest rates. Therefore, we now assume that the interest rate on deposits (r_d) is given by the following schedule that accounts for higher liquidity premium in high interest rate regime:

$$r_d = r(1 - \alpha) - \beta, \quad (\text{A.10})$$

where $0 < \alpha < 1$ and β are positive numbers. As shown in Appendix A.2.3:

$$\frac{\partial P[\cdot]}{\partial r} = -\alpha D T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) < 0 \quad (\text{A.11})$$

Therefore, the value of the put option decreases when interest rates are high. Consequently, the supply of deposits decreases in a high interest rate regime. As shown in Appendix A.2.3, we get the following relation between optimal deposit quantity supplied by the banks and interest

rates:

$$c \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial r} = -\alpha T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) < 0. \quad (\text{A.12})$$

Therefore, the optimal quantity of deposits decreases when interest rates go up. The effect is stronger when parameter c is smaller, i.e., for banks that are likely to face a lower marginal cost of raising deposits. Similarly, the effects are stronger for banks that have depositors who value liquidity more (the α parameter).

A.2 Derivations

A.2.1 Sensitivity of Market Value of Deposit Insurance to r

$$\begin{aligned} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] &= K e^{-rT} \Phi(-d_2) - L \Phi(-d_1) \\ d_1 &= \frac{\ln(\frac{L}{K}) + (r + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}}; \\ d_2 &= d_1 - \sigma \sqrt{T}; \\ K &= D \cdot e^{rT}; \\ \frac{L}{K} &= \frac{D}{w D \cdot e^{rT}} = \frac{1}{w \cdot e^{rT}}. \\ \sigma &= \hat{b} - \hat{a} * r \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.13})$$

$$\begin{aligned} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] &= D \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{D}{w} \Phi(-d_1) \\ d_1 &= \frac{-\ln(w \cdot e^{rT}) + (r + \frac{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2}{2})T}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r) \sqrt{T}} \\ d_1 &= \frac{-\ln(w) - rT + (r + \frac{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2}{2})T}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r) \sqrt{T}} \\ d_1 &= \frac{-\ln(w) + (\frac{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2}{2})T}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r) \sqrt{T}} \\ d_1 &= \frac{-\ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r) \sqrt{T}} + \frac{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r) \sqrt{T}}{2} \\ d_2 &= d_1 - (\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r) \sqrt{T} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.14})$$

It follows that:

$$\frac{1}{D} \frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial r} = \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} - \frac{1}{w} \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} \quad (\text{A.15})$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} &= \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial d_1} \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial r} \\
&= -\phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left\{ \frac{-\ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)\sqrt{T}} + \frac{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)\sqrt{T}}{2} \right\} \\
&= -\phi(-d_1) \left\{ \frac{-\hat{a} \cdot \ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2 \sqrt{T}} - \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{2} \right\} \\
&= \phi(-d_1) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a} \cdot \ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2 \sqrt{T}} + \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{2} \right\}
\end{aligned} \tag{A.16}$$

Now,

$$\begin{aligned}
\phi(-d_2) &= \phi(d_2) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{d_2^2}{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T})^2}{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(d_1^2 - 2d_1\sigma\sqrt{T} + \sigma^2 T)}{2}} \\
&= \phi(d_1) e^{-\frac{(-2d_1\sigma\sqrt{T} + \sigma^2 T)}{2}} = \phi(d_1) e^{-\frac{(-2(\ln \frac{1}{K} + (r + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})T) + \sigma^2 T)}{2}} \\
&= \phi(d_1) e^{\ln(\frac{1}{K}) + rT} = \phi(d_1) e^{\ln(\frac{1}{w \cdot e^{rT}}) + rT} \\
&= \phi(d_1) e^{-\ln(w)} = \frac{1}{w} \phi(d_1)
\end{aligned} \tag{A.17}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} &= -\phi(-d_2) \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial r} \\
&= -\phi(-d_2) \left\{ \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial r} + \hat{a} \sqrt{T} \right\} \\
&= -\frac{1}{w} \phi(d_1) \left\{ \frac{-\hat{a} \cdot \ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2 \sqrt{T}} + \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{2} \right\}
\end{aligned} \tag{A.18}$$

Combining with equation 14 above:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{1}{D} \frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial r} &= \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} - \frac{1}{w} \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} \\
&= -\frac{1}{w} \phi(d_1) \left\{ \frac{-\hat{a} \cdot \ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2 \sqrt{T}} + \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{2} \right\} - \frac{1}{w} \phi(-d_1) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a} \cdot \ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2 \sqrt{T}} + \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{2} \right\} \\
&= \left(\frac{1}{w} - \frac{1}{w} \right) \phi(d_1) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a} \cdot \ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)^2 \sqrt{T}} \right\} + \phi(d_1) \left(-\frac{1}{w} - \frac{1}{w} \right) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{2} \right\} \\
&= \phi(d_1) \left(-\frac{2}{w} \right) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{2} \right\} = -\phi(d_1) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a} \sqrt{T}}{w} \right\}
\end{aligned} \tag{A.19}$$

Since $w > 0$, the above value is negative for all parameter values.

A.2.2 Bank's Optimization Problem

$$\max_{\{D\}} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] - \frac{1}{2}cD^2 - \bar{p}D$$

FOC:

$$\frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial D} = cD + \bar{p}$$

Note:

$$\begin{aligned} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] &= D\Phi(-d_2) - \frac{D}{w}\Phi(-d_1) \\ d_1 &= \frac{-\ln(w)}{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)\sqrt{T}} + \frac{(\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)\sqrt{T}}{2} \\ d_2 &= d_1 - (\hat{b} - \hat{a} * r)\sqrt{T} \end{aligned} \tag{A.20}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial D} &= \Phi(-d_2) + D \cdot \frac{\Phi(-d_2)}{\partial D} - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} - \frac{D}{w} \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial D} \\ &= \Phi(-d_2) - D\phi(-d_2) \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial D} - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} + \frac{D}{w} \phi(-d_1) \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial D} \\ &= \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} \end{aligned} \tag{A.21}$$

Therefore, optimal quantity of deposits is given by the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} &= cD + \bar{p} \\ D^* &= \frac{1}{c} \left\{ \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} - \bar{p} \right\} \end{aligned} \tag{A.22}$$

Optimal supply of deposits decreases when marginal cost c is higher; and when deposit insurance premium paid, $\bar{p}$ is higher. It increases when the default option has higher value.

Now using the envelope theorem, let's find the sensitivity of optimal D w.r.t. ' r '

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial r} &= \frac{1}{c} \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \left\{ \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} \right\} \\ &= -\phi(d_1) \left\{ \frac{\hat{a}\sqrt{T}}{cw} \right\} \end{aligned} \tag{A.23}$$

Therefore, when interest rate goes up, optimal deposit financing comes down.

A.2.3 Model with Liquidity Benefits of Deposits

Suppose a bank makes a loan of value L with a maturity of T_L at an interest rate r_L . Risk-free rate is r and $r_L > r$. Loan is funded with insured deposit D and equity capital of E . For simplicity

assume that the deposits are issued as zero coupon bond with maturity T and a promised rate of return of r_D . Therefore, deposit has a face value of $De^{r_d T} \equiv K$. Rate of return on deposits is below the market rate of return r , specifically, $r_d = r(1 - \alpha) - \beta$, where $0 < \alpha < 1$, and $\beta > 0$. This is a flexible parametrization that captures both a fixed amount and a variable amount of liquidity premium a depositor is willing to pay.

Deposits are insured by the FDIC at a fixed rate of c per unit of the market value of a deposit. The market value of the deposit insurance, P , can be obtained by a standard put option formula on the asset value of the bank with the face value of a deposit as the strike price.

$$\begin{aligned} P[L, K, \sigma, r, T] &= Ke^{-rT} \Phi(-d_2) - L\Phi(-d_1) \\ d_1 &= \frac{\ln(\frac{L}{K}) + (r + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})T}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \\ d_2 &= d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.24})$$

The amount of subsidy that a bank enjoys on its insured deposit is the difference between the market value of deposit insurance and the premium paid. The subsidy changes as interest rates change because the fair market valuation of deposit insurance changes with interest rate. When interest rates are high, market value comes down and therefore the subsidy enjoyed by banks comes down. Proof below:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial r} &= \frac{\partial Ke^{-rT} \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} - \frac{\partial L\Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} \\ &= \frac{\partial De^{r_d T} e^{-rT} \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} - \frac{\partial L\Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} \\ &= \frac{\partial De^{(-\alpha r - \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} - \frac{\partial L\Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} \\ &= \{-\alpha T De^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2)\} + \frac{De^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} - \frac{\partial L\Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.25})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} &= \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial d_1} \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial r} \\ &= -\phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \frac{\ln(\frac{L}{K}) + (r + \frac{\sigma^2}{2})T}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \\ &= -\phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \left\{ \frac{\partial}{\partial r} (-\ln K) + T \right\} \\ &= -\phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \left\{ \frac{\partial}{\partial r} (-\ln(De^{r_d T})) + T \right\} \\ &= -\phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \left\{ \frac{\partial}{\partial r} (-r_d T) + T \right\} \\ &= -\phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \{(-(1 - \alpha)T) + T\} \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.26})$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= -\phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T \\
\frac{\partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} &= -\phi(-d_2) \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial r} = -\phi(-d_2) \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial r} = -\phi(-d_2) \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T \\
\frac{\partial P[\cdot]}{\partial r} &= \{-\alpha T D e^{(-\alpha r - \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2)\} \\
&\quad - D e^{-\alpha r T} \phi(-d_2) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T + L \phi(-d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T
\end{aligned} \tag{A.28}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\phi(-d_2) &= \phi(d_2) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{d_2^2}{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(d_1 - \sigma\sqrt{T})^2}{2}} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(d_1^2 - 2d_1\sigma\sqrt{T} + \sigma^2 T)}{2}} \\
&= \phi(d_1) \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{(-2d_1\sigma\sqrt{T} + \sigma^2 T)}{2}} \\
&= \phi(d_1) e^{\ln(\frac{L}{D}) + rT} = \phi(d_1) e^{\ln(\frac{L}{D e^{r_d T}}) + rT} \\
&= \phi(d_1) e^{rT} \frac{L}{D e^{r_d T}} = \phi(d_1) e^{(\alpha r + \beta)T} \frac{L}{D}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\partial P[\cdot]}{\partial r} = \{-\alpha T D e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2)\} \tag{A.29}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&- D e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \phi(d_2) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T + L \phi(d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T \\
&= \{-\alpha T D e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2)\}
\end{aligned} \tag{A.30}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&- D e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \phi(d_1) e^{(\alpha r + \beta)T} \frac{L}{D} \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T + L \phi(d_1) \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{T}} \alpha T \\
&= -\alpha D T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) < 0
\end{aligned} \tag{A.31}$$

Note from the first order condition:

$$\frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial D} = cD + \bar{p} \tag{A.32}$$

$$\frac{\partial P[L, K, \sigma, r, T]}{\partial D} = \frac{\partial K e^{-rT} \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial D} - \frac{\partial L \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial D} \tag{A.33}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \frac{\partial D e^{r_d T} e^{-rT} \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial D} - \frac{\partial D \Phi(-d_1)}{w \partial D} \\
&= \frac{\partial D e^{(-\alpha r - \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial D} - \frac{\partial D \Phi(-d_1)}{w \partial D} \\
&= e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) + \frac{D e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial D} - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} - \frac{D \partial \Phi(-d_1)}{w \partial D} \\
&= e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) - D e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \phi(-d_2) \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial D} - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} + \frac{D}{w} \phi(-d_1) \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial D} \\
&= e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w}
\end{aligned} \tag{A.34}$$

Optimal deposit quantity is given by:

$$e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} = cD^* + \bar{p}$$

$$D^* = \frac{1}{c} \left\{ e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) - \frac{\Phi(-d_1)}{w} - \bar{p} \right\}$$

Therefore, the sensitivity of deposit supply to interest rate is given by the following:

$$\begin{aligned} c \frac{\partial D^*}{\partial r} &= -\alpha T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) + e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_2)}{\partial r} - \frac{1}{w} \frac{\partial \Phi(-d_1)}{\partial r} \\ &= -\alpha T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) - e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \phi(-d_2) \frac{\partial d_2}{\partial r} + \frac{1}{w} \phi(-d_1) \frac{\partial d_1}{\partial r} \\ &= -\alpha T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) - e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \phi(-d_2) \frac{\alpha T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} + \frac{1}{w} \phi(-d_1) \frac{\alpha T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \\ &= -\alpha T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) - e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \cdot e^{(\alpha r + \beta)T} \frac{1}{w} \phi(d_1) \frac{\alpha T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} + \frac{1}{w} \phi(d_1) \frac{\alpha T}{\sigma \sqrt{T}} \\ &= -\alpha T e^{-(\alpha r + \beta)T} \Phi(-d_2) < 0. \end{aligned} \tag{A.35}$$

A.3 Other Tables & Results





Figure A.1: Evolution of Insured Deposits


Notes: This figure plots the total amount of insured deposits (top panel) and the ratio of insured to total deposits (bottom panel) from 1982Q1 to 2024Q4. Both series are plotted against the effective federal funds rate.

Source: Call Reports, Federal Reserve Board (H.15 Release).

Figure A.2: Total Deposits Growth and Spread and LLP Ratio



(a) Total deposits and LLP Ratio



(b) Insured Deposit Rate Spread and LLP Ratio

Notes: This figure plots the relation between aggregate banking sector LLP growth and deposit outcomes. Panel (a) plots year-over-year total deposit growth against the LLP ratio. Panel (b) plots the insured deposit rate spread (fed funds rate minus average insured deposit rate) against the LLP ratio. The sample period is 1986-2021.

Source: Call Reports.




Figure A.3: Deposits and CDS spread

Notes: This figure plots the relation between quarterly deposit growth and alternative measures of bank risk. Panel (a) uses the CDS spread, panel (b) the bank bond credit spread, and panel (c) the implied volatility of bank equity. *Source:* Call Reports, Bloomberg.




Figure A.4: Fed Funds and LLP Ratio

Notes: This figure plots the relation between year-over-year quarterly Fed Funds growth rates and the LLP Ratio.

Source: Call Reports.

Table A.1: Bank Risk and Deposit Growth

	Ins. Dep. Growth		Unins. Dep. Growth		Deposits Growth	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L.LLP Ratio	0.005*** (11.94)	0.004*** (11.42)	-0.002* (-1.71)	-0.004*** (-4.70)	0.001** (2.04)	0.001*** (3.20)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		0.015*** (21.77)		0.027*** (24.47)		0.017*** (26.94)
L.Loans to Assets		0.010*** (15.46)		0.043*** (34.30)		0.013*** (24.29)
L.Deposits to Assets		-0.284*** (-32.35)		-0.624*** (-45.81)		-0.340*** (-39.32)
L.Real Estate Loans		-0.044*** (-9.82)		-0.050*** (-5.69)		-0.030*** (-7.48)
L.Log(Assets)		-0.057*** (-14.44)		-0.104*** (-17.78)		-0.057*** (-15.53)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE		✓		✓		✓
Observations	890,707	890,707	886,241	886,241	1,149,956	1,149,956
R^2	0.08	0.14	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.14

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between the LLP Ratio of a bank and the growth rate of the bank's deposits. The outcome variable in Columns (1)–(2) is the growth rate of insured deposits, in Columns (3)–(4) the growth rate of uninsured deposits, and in Columns (5)–(6) the growth rate of total deposits. Even-numbered columns add the lagged book equity-to-assets ratio, loans-to-assets ratio, deposits-to-assets ratio, real estate loan share, and log assets as controls, along with bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All specifications include year-quarter and bank fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table A.2: Bank Equity Ratio and Insured Deposits

	Insured Fraction					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
L.Market Equity to Quasi Market Assets	-1.095*** (-4.88)	-1.088*** (-4.82)	-1.022*** (-4.55)			
L.Book Equity to Book Assets				-0.218*** (-3.94)	-0.819*** (-14.18)	-0.604*** (-8.26)
L.Loans to Assets			-0.096 (-0.30)			0.277*** (3.29)
L.Deposits to Assets			4.553 (1.57)			2.719*** (2.82)
L.Real Estate Loans			5.955*** (2.71)			4.466*** (7.53)
L.Log(Assets)		0.722 (0.96)	1.045 (1.34)		-4.258*** (-22.23)	-2.914*** (-6.57)
L.Cash To Assets			2.227 (0.41)			0.809 (0.98)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE			✓			✓
Observations	95,647	95,647	95,568	972,981	972,981	972,981
R^2	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.76	0.77	0.77

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between bank capitalization and the insured deposit share. The outcome variable in all columns is the fraction of insured deposits as a percentage of total deposits. Columns (1)–(3) use market equity to quasi-market assets (market value of equity + book value of liabilities) as the capitalization measure; Columns (4)–(6) use book equity to book assets. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.

Table A.3: Aggregate Bank Risk and Deposits

	Dep. Growth	Insured. Dep Growth	Insured Dep. Spread
	(1)	(2)	(3)
LLP Ratio	-1.296 (-1.58)	2.354** (2.17)	-0.406*** (-5.62)
Change in Fed Funds	-1.709** (-2.08)	-0.508 (-0.64)	0.436*** (5.83)
Fed Balance Sheet Growth	0.045 (0.93)	0.038 (1.26)	0.010*** (3.32)
Observations	71	71	71
R^2	0.2330	0.3333	0.6550

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table presents time-series regressions examining the relation between aggregate banking sector LLP growth and deposit outcomes. The sample consists of quarterly observations from 1986 to 2021. LLP Ratio is the year-over-year growth rate in aggregate loan loss provisions for all banks in the banking system. The dependent variable in Column (1) is the year-over-year quarterly growth rate in total deposits. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the year-over-year quarterly growth rate in insured deposits. The dependent variable in Column (3) is the aggregate insured deposit spread, defined as the fed funds rate minus the average rate offered on insured deposits. All variables are computed as log changes relative to the same quarter one year earlier to remove seasonal effects.

Source: Call Reports

Table A.4: Robustness: Branch Level Deposit Supply without Headquarters

	Log(Branch Deposits)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
L.LLP Ratio	0.014*** (3.08)	0.014*** (2.66)	0.016*** (3.55)	0.018*** (3.98)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets	-0.045*** (-5.93)	-0.038*** (-4.55)	-0.036*** (-5.61)	-0.036*** (-5.58)
L.Loans to Assets	0.025** (2.50)	0.025** (2.29)	0.027*** (2.63)	0.026*** (2.61)
L. No. Branches	-0.041** (-2.02)	-0.041** (-1.99)	-0.046*** (-2.82)	-0.047*** (-3.06)
L.Log(Assets)	0.041** (2.11)	0.041* (1.92)	0.036** (1.96)	0.030* (1.69)
L.Real Estate Loans	0.104 (1.32)	0.094 (1.11)	0.029 (0.36)	0.084 (1.08)
L.Deposits to Assets	0.167** (2.25)	0.133* (1.74)	0.196*** (3.39)	0.188*** (3.32)
Branch FE		✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile $\times$ Time FE		✓	✓	✓
State $\times$ Time FE			✓	
County $\times$ Time FE				✓
Observations	1,683,012	1,578,534	1,578,506	1,570,903
R^2	0.8950	0.8929	0.8952	0.9032

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Notes: This table documents the relation between a bank's LLP Ratio and branch-level deposit quantities, measured as log total deposits. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects, branch state by year-quarter fixed effects, and branch county by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company. *Source:* Call Reports, Summary of Deposits.

Table A.5: Model Estimate of Bank Risk and Insured Deposits

	Insured Fraction								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
L.Model Est. of Deposit Insurance Premium				8.932*** (7.63)	8.171*** (7.62)	5.204*** (4.77)	8.932*** (7.63)	8.171*** (7.62)	5.204*** (4.77)
L.Book Equity to Book Assets		-0.490*** (-6.79)	-0.531*** (-7.11)		-0.530*** (-7.34)	-0.577*** (-7.72)		-0.530*** (-7.34)	-0.577*** (-7.72)
L.Loans to Assets		0.168* (1.93)	0.151* (1.75)		0.200** (2.28)	0.184** (2.12)		0.200** (2.28)	0.184** (2.12)
L.Deposits to Assets		1.764* (1.77)	1.569 (1.57)		2.109** (2.10)	1.863* (1.86)		2.109** (2.10)	1.863* (1.86)
L.Real Estate Loans		4.247*** (6.67)	4.587*** (7.27)		4.075*** (6.39)	4.404*** (6.96)		4.075*** (6.39)	4.404*** (6.96)
L.DI premium per dollar of total deposits	36.806*** (24.74)	34.138*** (24.49)	31.261*** (22.34)						
L.Log(Assets)		-4.913*** (-24.32)	-3.109*** (-7.05)		-4.928*** (-24.33)	-3.116*** (-7.06)		-4.928*** (-24.33)	-3.116*** (-7.06)
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Size Decile × Time FE			✓			✓			✓
Observations	890,564	890,564	890,564	890,564	890,564	890,564	890,564	890,564	890,564
R ²	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.77	0.78	0.78

Notes: This table documents the relation between the LLP Ratio of a bank and the bank's uninsured deposits in Columns (1) - (3) and total deposits in Columns (4) - (6). The outcome variable in Columns (1) - (3) is the log of total uninsured deposits. The outcome variable in Columns (4) - (6) is the log of total deposits. When indicated, specifications include year-quarter, bank, and bank size decile by year-quarter fixed effects. All explanatory variables are standardized, and standard errors are clustered by bank holding company.

Source: Call Reports.